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NECESSITY MAY BE THE MOTHER OF
INVENTION, BUT WHO GETS CUSTODY?:
THE OWNERSHIP OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY CREATED BY AN
EMPLOYED INVENTOR
By Christopher M. Mislow*
One of the hottest new items in the microcomputer' market
today is the so-called "portable" computer.2 In one crucial respect,
though, computers have always been portable: the knowledge un-
derlying each particular technology travels in the mind of every per-
son familiar with it.3 Hence, when a skilled employee leaves his
employment, he often carries with him valuable information con-
cerning his former employer's business.4 The more knowledgeable
employees, moreover, being in greater demand, tend to shift jobs
more frequently.5 And the problems raised by employee mobility
are especially acute in the computer industry, where, in amoeba-like
fashion, employees split from one firm to join or form another with
breath-taking rapidity.6
©1985 Christopher M. Mislow
* Christopher M. Mislow practices law with the firm of Giauque and Williams in Salt
Lake City, Utah. He specializes in business litigation in the computer and high technology
area and served as counsel in Hubco Data Products Corporation v. Management Assistance
Incorporated, 81-1295 (D. Idaho Aug 26, 1980) (App. dismissed by stipulation 9th Cir.,
1984). Mr. Mislow received his B.A. Magna Cum Laude from Princeton University in 1975,
and received his J.D. from the University of Virginia in 1978.
1. Microcomputers, popularly referred to as "personal computers," are the smallest
class of computers in the spectrum from microcomputers through supercomputers. The pri-
mary characteristic of "micros" is that their central processing units (the area where the
logical and arithmetic operations usually associated with the term "computing" occur) are
implemented on a single integrated circuit known as a microprocessor. C. PARKER, UNDER-
STANDING COMPUTERS AND DATA PROCESSING 18-20 (1984).
2. See R. GRELEWICZ, TAKE IT WITH YOU: THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO PORTABLE
BUSINESS COMPUTING 1-3 (1984). But see COMPTJTERWORLD, Aug. 27, 1984, at 73, col. 5
(portable computer sales have failed to live up to expectations.).
3. Cf. Futurecraft Corp. v. Clary Corp., 205 Cal. App. 2d 279, 288, 23 Cal. Rptr. 198,
210 (1962) ("The court cannot compel a man who changes employers to wipe clean the slate
of his memory."). Accord, GTI Corp. v. Calhoon, 309 F. Supp. 762, 767 (S.D. Ohio 1969);
Peerless Pattern Co. v. Pictorial Review Co., 147 App. Div. 715, 717, 132 N.Y.S. 37, 39
(1911).
4. See generally Note, Industrial Secrets and the Skilled Employee, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV.
324, 334-47 (1963).
5. Wexler v. Greenburg, 399 Pa. 569, 576, 160 A.2d 430, 433 (1960).
6. In one series of employee defections, for example, Bell Laboratories begat Shockley
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Much has been written about the legal techniques available to
intellectual property owners seeking to halt the use or disclosure of
inventions by former employees.7 But this concern begs a central
issue, viz., does the supposedly aggrieved former employer own the
invention?' Where an employee merely becomes familiar with his
employer's inventions while on the job, and then, having jumped
ship, uses his acquired knowledge of those inventions in competi-
tion with his former employer,9 the legal characterization of his ac-
tions is virtually a foregone conclusion. In these circumstances, the
employer is deemed to have disclosed his invention to the employee
in confidence; any misappropriation of the information thus dis-
closed is a betrayal of that confidence.10 In those circumstances
where it was the former employee himself who actually created the
invention, however, a much closer question arises, for "no one
sells or mortgages all the products of his brain to his employer by
the mere fact of employment.' 2
The issue is further complicated by the ofttimes balkanized na-
ture of ownership rights, in intellectual property. One party may
"own" an invention, yet be unable to prohibit, or even to exact pay-
ment for, another party's use of that invention.13 Nor is the ques-
tion limited to the context of a master-servant relationship;
Semiconductor Laboratories, which begat Fairchild Semiconductor, which begat Intel, which
begat Zilog, which begat Xilinx. See R. ZAKS, FROM CHIPS TO SYSTEMS: AN INTRODUC-
TION TO MICROPROCEssoRs 30 (1981); COMPUTERWORLD, Apr. 16, 1984, at 88, cols. 1-3;
Larson, In High-Tech Industry, New Firms Often Get Fast Trip to Courtroom, Wall St. J.,
Aug. 14, 1984, at 1, col. 6.
7. See, e.g., Leydig, Protecting Trade Secrets When Employees Move, 21 Bus. LAW.
325 (1966).
8. Cf Barlow & Seelig Mfg. Co. v. Patch, 232 Wis. 220, 222, 286 N.W. 577, 579
(1939) (characterizing a dispute over ownership of an invention created by the defendant
while in the plaintiffs employ as "a question of meum et tuum").
9. See, e.g., Junker v. Plummer, 320 Mass. 76, 67 N.E. 2d 667 (1946) (employee at-
tempted to compete with his former employer using a trade secret which had been the former
employer's "brain child").
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 395, 396 (1957); Allen Mfg. Co. v. Loika,
145 Conn. 509, 517, 144 A.2d 306, 309 (1958).
11. The distinction, though, has occasionally been overlooked. See, e.g., Sperry Rand
Corp. v. Rothlein, 241 F. Supp. 549 (D. Conn. 1964), where the court, in something of a non
sequitur, quoted from Allen Mfg. Co. v. Loika, 145 Conn. 509, 514, 144 A.2d 306, 309 (1958)
("the law is well settled that knowledge acquired by an employee during his employment
cannot be used for his own advantage ....") (emphasis added) in support of its conclusion
that "[t]he fact that it was the defendants who developed the process gives them no greater
right to use it . . .than that of any other employee." 241 F. Supp. at 564-65 (emphasis
added).
12. Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover, 177 F. Supp. 601, 604 (D.D.C. 1959),
rev'd on other grounds, 109 U.S. App. D.C. 128, 284 F.2d 262 (1960), vacated per curiam for
insufficient record, 369 U.S. 111 (1962).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 59-94, 123-25, 238-39.
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independent consultants'4 can walk off with valuable information
just as easily as can employees. t5
This article analyzes the ownership of inventions created by
employees 6 and by employed consultants. 7 The purpose of this
article is not to suggest any radical departure from prevailing legal
principles, although reasons for change are hardly lacking."8
Rather, its aim is more pragmatic: to chart a course through the
turbid waters of current legal doctrine so that the reader may be
more aware of the shoals en route. To that end, Part I discusses the
manner in which the ownership rights in three recognized forms of
intellectual property- patents, trade secrets and copyrights' 9  -
14. Whether one is an independent contractor or an employee depends upon a number
of variables, among them: (1) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the employer
may exercise over the details of the work; (2) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a
distinct occupation or business; (3) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the
locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist with-
out supervision; (4) the skill required in the particular occupation; (5) whether the employer
or the one employed supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person
doing the work; (6) the length of time for which the person is employed; (7) the method of
payment, whether by the time or by the job; (8) whether or not the work is a part of the
regular business of the employer; and (9) whether or not the parties believe they are creating
the relation of master and servant. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1957). The
most important factor is the degree of control. If the employer reserves the right to control
not only the result to be achieved, but also the means to be used in attaining that result, then
an employer-employee relationship usually exists. If, on the other hand, the employer
reserves only the right to control the result to be achieved, then an independent contractor
relationship usually exists. E.g., Building Material and Dump Truck Drivers, Teamsters Lo-
cal Union No. 36 v. NLRB, 215 U.S. App. D.C. 373, 669 F.2d 759 (1981), affid on other
grounds sub nom. Shepard v. NLRB, 459 U.S. 344 (1983).
15. This facet of the problem will become more important as the proportion of research
contracted to outside consultants increases. See generally Stedman, Employer-Employee Re-
lations, in F. NEUMEYER, THE EMPLOYED INVENTOR IN THE UNITED STATES: R&D POLI-
CIES, LAW AND PRACTICE 29, 70-71 (1971) [hereinafter cited as NEUMEYER].
16. It has been estimated that 84 percent of American patents are awarded to employed
inventors. Rights of Employed Inventors: Hearings on H.R. 4732 and H.R. 6635 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Commit-
tee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1982) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
17. See supra note 15.
18. See, eg., Alam, Employer's Obligations Regarding Employee Inventions - A New
Perspective, 8 EMPL. REL. L.J. 463 (1982); Doherty & Iandiorio, The Law of the Employed
Inventor - Time for a Change? 57 MASS. L.Q. 27 (1972); Orkin, The Legal Rights of the
Employed Inventor. New Approaches to Old Problems (pts. 1 & 2), 56 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 648,
719 (1974); Note, Computer Programs and Other Faculty Writings Under the Work-for-Hire
Doctrine: Who Owns the Intellectual Property?, 1 Santa Clara Computer and High-Tech. L.J.
141 (1985); Note, Patent Ownership: An Employer's Right to His Employee's Inventions, 58
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 863, 887-88 (1983); Note, Trade Secrets and the Skilled Employee in
the Computer Industry, 61 WASH. U.L.Q. 823, 843-47 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Trade
Secrets]; Note, The Freelancer's Trap: Work for Hire under the Copyright Act of 1976, 86 W.
VA. L. REV. 1305 (1984).
19. Patents, copyrights and trade secrets are sometimes referred to as the "big three" of
intellectual property law. See R. BAKER, SCUTFLE THE COMPUTER PIRATES: SOFTWARE
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are allocated in the absence of an express contract. Part II then
explores some of the obstacles to an allocation of ownership rights
by express contract.
I. OWNERSHIP IN THE ABSENCE OF AN EXPRESS CONTRACT
A. Patents
1. Persons Hired to Invent
Ordinarily, the person who invents or discovers a patentable
process or device20 is entitled to the patent thereon.21 Only by as-
signment can this right be divested.22 Included in this category of
persons is the inventive employee hired to perform non-inventive
work.23 When an employee is hired to invent, however, the law
implies a duty to assign all resulting patents to his employer,24 the
PROTECTION SCHEMES 9 (1984). Intellectual property not fitting within those categories,
however, may nevertheless be entitled to judicial recognition and protection. See, e.g., 15
U.S.C. §§ 1051-1072, 1091-1096, 1111-1121, 1123-1127 (1984) (trademarks, service marks,
certification marks and collective marks); Nucor Corp. v. Tennessee Forging Steel Service,
Inc., 476 F.2d 386 (8th Cir. 1973) (confidential information not rising to the level of a trade
secret). See also Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat.
3347 (1984), which protects integrated circuit photolithography masks as a suigeneris species
of intellectual property.
20. The Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1982), was enacted pursuant to Congress' con-
stitutional authority "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. To acquire patent protection under the Act, an
inventor must first create an "invention." An invention does not occur until the subject
matter of the invention has been both conceived and reduced to practice. Rex Chainbelt Inc.
v. Borg-Warner Corp., 477 F.2d 481, 487 (7th Cir. 1973). ("Conception" denotes the com-
plete mental act of formulating the invention to be claimed; "reduction to practice" denotes
the making of a prototype and the testing of it to see whether or not it performs as envisioned.
USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 213, 245 (N.D. Ill. 1981), affid inpart,
rev'd in part on other grounds, 694 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982)). The inventor must then estab-
lish that the invention is a "new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof," that the invention has not already been
thought of by others, and that the invention was not obvious to one familiar with prior art.
35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (1982).
21. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) provides, in pertinent part, that "[w]hoever invents or dis-
covers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor. . ....
22. United States v. Dubiller Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 187 (1933); Marshall v.
Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co., 175 F.2d 215, 216 (3d Cir. 1949).
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 397 (1958). See, e.g., Wommack v. Dur-
ham Pecan Co., 715 F.2d 962 (5th Cir. 1983) (general laborer earning $1.80 per hour at pecan
processing factory devised method for vastly improving the processing of pecans); McNa-
mara v. Powell, 256 App. Div. 554, 11 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1939) (traveling muffler salesman con-
ceived idea for new type of muffler). See also text accompanying note 13.
24. Kg., Standard Parts Co. v. Peck, 264 U.S. 52 (1924). The employee hired to invent
has been likened to a miner hired to find and remove precious minerals: the miner is paid
whether or not he finds anything, but any gems belong to his employer. See G. KIVENSON,
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rationale being that:
If one is employed to devise or perfect an instrument, or a means
for accomplishing a prescribed result, he cannot, after success-
fully accomplishing the work for which he was employed, plead
title thereto as against his employer. That which he has been
employed and paid to accomplish becomes, when accomplished,
the property of his employer. Whatever rights as an individual
he may have had in and to his inventive powers, and that which
they are able to accomplish, he has sold in advance to his
employer.
2 5
It is of no consequence, in other words, whether such an employee
is assigned to a specific project26 or works in general research and
development;27 in either event, "what he is paid to produce belongs
to his paymaster. ' 28  The same rule applies to independent consul-
tants as well.29
Distinguishing employed inventors from inventive employees,
however, entails more than simply looking for the people wearing
white lab smocks. In some instances, identifying employed inven-
THE ART AND SCIENCE OF INVENTING 229 (2d ed. 1982). This rule appears to comport with
employer expectations, see Rossman, Rewards and Incentives to Employee-Inventors, in NuR-
TURING NEW IDEAS: LEGAL RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC ROLES 23, 39 (L. Harris ed. 1969)
[hereinafter cited as NURTURING NEW IDEAS], although employed inventors do not always
share their employers' viewpoint. See id, at 42 (Table I).
25. Solomons v. United States, 137 U.S. 342, 346 (1890). Another rationale often ad-
vanced to justify the compulsory assignment of patent rights to an inventor's employer is the
"risk of the enterprise" doctrine. See eg., National Dev. Co. v. Gray, 316 Mass. 240, 246, 55
N.E.2d 783, 787 (1944) ("If the employee fails to reach his goal the loss falls upon the em-
ployer, but if he succeeds in accomplishing the prescribed method then the invention belongs
to the employer .. "). But cf. GAF Corp. v. Anchem Prod. Inc., 399 F. Supp. 647, 658-
59 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (invoking the "risk of the enterprise" doctrine to estop an employer from
challenging the validity of a use patent obtained by a cousulting firm that the employer had
hired to conduct research concerning possible uses for the employer's chemicals).
26. See e.g. Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Fankhanel, 49 F. Supp. 611 (D. Md. 1943);
North American Phillips Co. v. Brownshield, 111 F. Supp. 762 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Forberg v.
Servel, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); National Dev. Co. v. Gray, 316 Mass. 240, 55
N.E.2d 783 (1944).
27. See eg., Belanger v. Alton Box Board Co., 180 F.2d 87 (7th Cir. 1950); Misani v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 83 N.J. Super. 1, 198 A.2d 791 (App. Div. 1964), rev'd on other
grounds, 44 N.J. 552, 210 A.2d 609, appeal dismissed, 382 U.S. 203 (1965); Davis v. Alwac
Int'l Inc., 369 S.W.2d 797 (Civ. App. 1963).
28. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 187 (1933).
29. See, e.g., St. Louis & O'Fallon Coal Co. v. Dinwiddie, 53 F.2d 655 (D. Md. 1931),
a.'d, 64 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1933); Met-Pro, Inc. v. Judson Bros. Co., 86 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
553, 556 (Pa. C.P. 1950) (dictum); cf. Tennessee Copper & Chemical Corp. v. Martin, 4 F.
Supp. 38, 41 (D.N.J. 1932) (treating a per diem consultant as "an employee" for purposes of
the "hired to invent" rule), afftd, 66 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1933). But cf. GAF Corp. v. Anchem
Prod., Inc., 399 F. Supp. 647 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (consulting firm hired to test agricultural chem-
icals for commercial uses entitled to obtain a use patent).
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tors is an easy task."0 But a virtually imperceptible line often sepa-
rates those employees paid to be inventive from those merely
encouraged to be creative.3  In Melin v. United States,3 2 for exam-
ple, the general manager of a lumber manufacturing company had
been assigned the responsibility of supervising the construction of a
new plant. Part of his assignment was specifically to incorporate in
the new plant as much labor-saving equipment as possible. In an
effort to meet this directive, the general manager conceived the idea
for a semi-automatic lumber-handling device, called a "mechanical
off-bear and slab-handling apparatus," which he later patented.
Ruling that the general manager, and not his employer, was entitled
to ownership of the patent rights to that apparatus, the Court of
Claims reasoned that "[a]lthough [the general manager] was di-
rected by [his employer] to incorporate in the new plant as much
labor-saving equipment as possible, he was not employed . . . to
invent the mechanical off-bear and slab-handling apparatus, or any
other equipment."33
A kindred and equally gossamer distinction separates research
from its tandem partner development. Employees assigned to con-
duct research34 usually are deemed hired to invent,35 while employ-
30. See, eg., Belanger v. Alton Box Board Co., 180 F.2d 87 (7th Cir. 1950) (employee
was an "idea man" in charge of employer's research department). Titles, however, are not
dispositive. See Houghton v. United States, 23 F.2d 386 (4th Cir.) (merely because an em-
ployee was hired as a "chemist" rather than as an "inventor" did not negate his implied duty
to assign patents to his employer, where, in fact, he had been assigned to conduct research
projects), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 592 (1928).
31. Compare, eg., International Pulverizing Corp. v. Kidwell, 7 N.J. Super. 345, 71
A.2d 151 (Ch. 1950) (mechanical engineer directed to perform experiments to improve effi-
ciency of pulverizing mill, held, hired to invent), with Barlow & Seelig Mfg. Co. v. Patch, 232
Wis. 220, 286 N.W. 577 (1939) (mechancial engineer directed to improve design of washing
machine, held, not hired to invent).
32. 478 F.2d 1210 (1973).
33. Id. at 759, 478 F.2d at 1216 (emphasis in original).
34. "Research" has been defined as "careful or critical inquiry or examination in seek-
ing facts or principles." United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 49 F.2d 306, 312 (D.
Del. 1931), afl'd, 59 F.2d 381 (3d Cir. 1932), aftd, 289 U.S. 178 (1933). While inventing
usually presupposes research, research need not result in an invention. Id.
35. See, e.g., Belanger v. Alton Box Board Co., 180 F.2d 87 (7th Cir. 1950); Crown
Cork & Seal Co. v. Fankhanel, 49 F. Supp. 611 (D. Md. 1943). But cf. United States v.
Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 193-95 (1933) (government research scientists were
not hired to invent, where the uniform practice of the agency employing them had been to
permit all its employees to take out patents on their inventions). A close reading of the
Dubilier opinion reveals, however, that the research scientist therein were indeed hired for
their inventive talents. See id. at 211 (Stone, J., dissenting). Rather, because the employing
agency claimed merely a shop right in its employees' inventions, id. at 195-96; see generally
infra notes 59-94 and accompanying text, the government simply chose not to assert exclusive
rights to the fruits of their employees' efforts. Only in this context were the scientists not
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ees assigned to work solely on development, on the other hand,
usually are not:
Though the mental concept is embodied or realized in a mecha-
nism or a physical or chemical aggregate, the embodiment is not
the invention and is not the subject of a patent. This distinction
between the idea and its application in practice is the basis of the
rule that employment merely to design or to construct or to de-
vise methods of manufacture is not the sanie as employment to
invent.
36
Thus, in Barlow & Seelig Mfg. Co. v. Patch, 37 a mechanical engineer
directed to examine ways to improve a washing machine invented a
novel transmission mechanism which did, in fact, improve the per-
formance of his employer's washing machine. In an ensuing dispute
over the patent rights to the mechanism, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court ruled in favor of the engineer, holding that "[h]e was em-
ployed not in the hope that he would invent a new machine or a
new mechanical movement, but with the expectation that he would
develop and improve the product which the company was then
manufacturing.
38
Even when an employee is unquestionably hired .to invent, that
does not end the inquiry. The question still remains whether or not
the invention which he has created is one which he was paid to
create. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp.39 illustrates the
problem. Francis Dunmore and Percival Lowell were employed in
the radio laboratory section of the United States Bureau of Stan-
dards, and had been assigned to work on certain specific research
projects. A project involving radio reception devices had been as-
signed to other research scientists in the laboratory, and was not
part of Dunmore and Lowell's task. Nevertheless, "impelled
hired to invent, Le., not hired to invent for the exclusive benefit of their employer. See supra
notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
36. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 188 (1933) (dictum).
37. 232 Wis. 220, 286 N.W. 577 (1939).
38. Id. at 223, 286 N.W. at 579. Accord, De Jur-Amsco Corp. v. Fogle, 233 F.2d 141
(3d Cir. 1956); Cahill v. Regan, 5 N.Y.2d 292, 157 N.E.2d 505, 184 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1959).
But see International Pulverizing Corp. v. Kidwell, 7 N.J. Super. 345, 71 A.2d 151 (ch. 1950);
cf Davis v. Alwac Int'l Inc., 369 S.W.2d 797 (rex. Civ. App. 1963) (a corporate vice presi-
dent whose responsibilities included "technical development work," and who developed im-
provements to his employer's equipment, held, subject to an implied duty to assign patent
rights). In Standard Parts Co. v. Peck, 264 U.S. 52 (1924), an employee who had agreed to
"devote his time to the development of" a certain process was held to be subject to an implied
duty to assign his patents. Viewed in the context of the overall facts in Standard Parts,
however, it becomes clear that the term "develop" was used imprecisely, as a synonym for
"invent".
39. 289 U.S. 178 (1933). But see supra note 35.
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thereto solely by his own scientific curiosity," 4 Dunmore began
toying with the idea of improving radio reception sets by substitut-
ing alternating current in lieu of direct current. After some experi-
mentation at the Bureau of Standards laboratory, he and Lowell
then devised and patented an apparatus for operating radio recep-
tion sets by means of alternating current. Because this patented in-
vention was not the fruition of work on research projects assigned
to them,41 the Supreme Court ruled that Dunmore and Lowell were
under no duty to assign their patent to the federal government.
As a practical matter, determining whether or not an invention
is one that the employed inventor was paid to create involves the
classic scope-of-employment test42 whose outcome will vary with
the circumstances of each given situation. 3 Depending upon the
details of a particular employed inventor's assignment, upon the na-
ture of his invention and upon the relationship between the two, the
invention may or may not be within the scope of his employment.
Generalities, therefore, are of little avail.
In at least one significant respect, however, scope-of-employ-
ment analysis as applied in the employed inventor context differs
from its application in other contexts. A key factor usually taken
into account when determining whether or not certain conduct falls
within the scope of an individual's employment is whether or not
the conduct "occurs substantially within authorized time and space
limits . . . ." But time and space limits have little relevance to
the employed inventor, for creative minds seldom keep regular
hours.4 5 Accordingly, where and when the inspiration for an inven-
tion otherwise encompassed within the scope of an employed inven-
40. 289 U.S. at 184.
41. Id. at 193; cf id. at 197 ("The field of research is as broad as that of science itself.")
(dictum).
42. Conduct is generally deemed within the scope of a person's employment if (1) it is
of the kind that he is employed to perform; (2) it occurs substantially within authorized time
and space limits; and (3) it is motivated, at least in part, by a purpose to benefit his employer.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228(1) (1958).
43. State of Maryland ex rel. Barresi v. Hatch, 198 F. Supp. 1 (D. Conn. 1961); Heide
v. T.C.I., Inc., 264 Or. 535, 506 P.2d 486 (1973).
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228(1)(b) (1958).
45. See e.g., T. KIDDER, THE SOUL OF A NEW MACHINE 85 (1981) (idea for computer
memory enhancement conceived during a wedding, and scribbled on the cover of a match-
book); Land, On Some Conditions for Scientific Profundity in Industrial Research, in NUR-
TURING NEW IDEAS, supra note 24, at 7, 9 (idea for polaroid camera conceived while on
vacation); Wolff, Inventing at Breakfast, IEEE SPECTRUM, May 1975, at 44, 46 (idea for
snap-action disk conceived by MIT student during a summer job, while tending a sawmill
furnace at night); PEOPLE WEEKLY, Dec. 10, 1984, at 105 (idea for 3M's "Post-It" adhesive.
backed notepads conceived while daydreaming during a church sermon.) See also infra note
171.
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tor's job assignment occurs to him has minimal bearing on whether
he or his employer is entitled to the patent. As one court aptly
commented:
It is difficult to understand how [the employee] could cut his
mind off and on at will under the circumstances, i.e., think of
things during the lunch hour, for example, which would consti-
tute an improvement to [his employer's] product, and later claim
such improvement as his own because he was not working for the
company at that particular moment when the thought struck
him.
46
Courts thus routinely order employed inventors to assign to their
employers the patent rights to inventions conceived off-hours and
away from work.47
2. Persons Impliedly Assenting to Assign Their Patent
Rights
Whether an employee is hired to invent or not,48 he may be
deemed, by virtue of prior conduct consistent with such an obliga-
tion, implicitly to have acknowledged a contractual duty to assign
all patents to his employer.49 In Marshall v. Colgate-Palmolive-Peet
46. Daniel Orifice Fitting Co. v. Whalen, 198 Cal. App. 2d 791, 798, 18 Cal. Rptr. 659,
666 (1962).
47. See, eg., Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Fankhanel, 49 F. Supp. 611 (D. Md. 1943);
Daniel Orifice Fitting Co. v. Whalen, 198 Cal. App. 2d 791, 18 Cal. Rptr. 659 (1962); Na-
tional Dev. Co. v. Gray, 316 Mass. 240, 55 N.E.2d 783 (1944); Parker v. Rust-Proof Co. v.
Allen, 231 Mich. 69, 203 N.W. 890 (1925); Mainland Indus., Inc. v. Timberland Mach. and
Eng'g Corp., 58 Or. App. 585, 649 P.2d 613, petition for review denied, 293 Or. 801, 653 P.2d
999 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
48. Compare, eg., Mainland Indus., Inc. v. Timberland Mach. and Eng'g Corp., 58 Or.
App. 585, 649, P.2d 613 (1982) (engineer hired to invent), petition for review denied, 293 Or.
801, 653 P.2d 999 (1982), cerL denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983), with Fish v. Air-O-Fan Prod.
Corp., 285 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1960) (corporate vice president in charge of general operations).
49. Eg., New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Singmaster, 71 F.2d 277 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 293
U.S. 591 (1934); Marshall v. Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co., 175 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1949); Fish v.
Air-O-Fan Prod. Corp., 285 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1960); Daniel Orifice Fitting Co. v. Whalen,
198 Cal. App. 2d 791, 18 Cal. Rptr. 659 (1962); Mainland Indus., Inc. v. Timberland Mach.
and Eng'g Corp., 58 Or. App. 585, 649 P.2d 613, petition for review denied, 293 Or. 801, 653
P.2d 999 (1982), cerL denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
Although both this type of tacit agreement to assign and the type discussed in the text
accompanying notes 20-47, supra, are referred to as "implied contracts," each differs funda-
mentally from the other. The latter are more properly denominated "quasi-contracts" or
"contracts implied in law." These are not true contracts, but rather are legal fictions created
without regard to the parties' actual intent in order to prevent injustice. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 comment b (1981). They are, in other words, more a species of
remedy than a source of rights. The former variety of implied contracts, on the other hand,
are "contracts implied in fact." These differ from explicit agreements between the parties
only in that they have not been articulated orally or in writing, but instead are inferred from
the parties' conduct. Bloomgarden v. Coyer, 156 U.S. App. D.C. 109, 479 F.2d 201, 208
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Co. 5 for instance, the plaintiff had been the director of the defend-
ant's engineering department, where the practice had been to assign
patents to the defendant. In conformity with this practice, the
plaintiff himself had assigned to the defendant the patent rights to
several of his inventions, and had instructed his subordinates to do
likewise. On this basis, the court ruled that the plaintiff had tacitly
agreed to assign his patent rights: "[T]he constant practice in plain-
tiff's [engineering department] and his enforcement of the practice
on men under him as well as on outside engineers and his own in-
dependent compliance in other inventions indicate to me assent on
plaintiff's part that the inventions should belong to defendant.""1
Inferring the existence of a tacit agreement under these circum-
stances is merely an application of the "practical construction" doc-
trine, i.e., where two parties have not explicitly agreed upon how to
resolve a particular matter, their conduct is entitled to great weight
in ascertaining how they intend that it be resolved. 2 As was true
with regard to the question of an employed inventor's scope of em-
ployment,53 no one set of circumstances exist in which this doctrine
will guarantee the conclusion that an employee is obligated to as-
sign patent rights to his employer. Conforming to an unspoken
practice,54 obeying explicit instructions5 and submitting ideas
through an established suggestion system56 have all produced this
(1973). See generally 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 3A (3rd ed. 1957); Introductory Note in
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 4, 5-9 (1937).
50. 76 F. Supp. 378 (D. Del. 1948), aff'd, 175 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1949).
51. Id. at 389.
52. See, eg., Franklin Research and Dev. Corp. v. Swift Elec. Supply Co., 340 F.2d
439, 443 n.3 (2d Cir. 1964); U.C.C. § 1-205(3) (1976). The doctrine of practical construction
is premised upon the common sense concept that "actions speak louder than words." Crest-
view Cemetery Ass'n v. Dieden, 54 Cal. 2d 744, 750, 356 P.2d 171, 177, 8 Cal. Rptr. 427, 433
(1960). It becomes even more dispositive, therefore, in the absence of words addressing the
problem in dispute. See generally 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 558 (1960 & Kaufman Supp.
1984). Because the doctrine of practical construction purports to interpret the parties' agree-
ment ab initio rather than to infer a tacit modification thereof, the obstacle of furnishing
additional consideration that plagues express contracts of assignment executed after an inven-
tor is already employed, see infra notes 240-62 and accompanying text, does not arise here.
But cf. New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Singmaster 71 F.2d 277 (2d Cir.) (an inventor who had previ-
ously obeyed his employer's unilateral instructions, issued nearly twelve years after the inven-
tor began working for the employer, that all patentable ideas be assigned to it, was held to
have contractually assented to these instructions; the consideration issue, however, was never
addressed), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 591 (1934).
53. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
54. See, e.g., Marshall v. Colgate-Palmolive-Peet, 76 F. Supp. 378 (D. Del. 1948), aff'd,
175 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1949).
55. See, e.g., New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Singmaster, 71 F.2d 277 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 293
U.S. 591 (1934).
56. See Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. Rowland, 460 F.2d 697 (4th Cir. 1972).
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result. Suffice it to observe that, as a general proposition, 57 an em-
ployee who has assigned patent rights to his employer in the past
will usually be deemed bound to do so for all inventions conceived
during the term of his employment.5 8
3. Employer Shop Rights in Employee-Owned
Inventions
Even when an employed inventor is held to be the owner of his
inventions, that does not necessarily divest his employer of all
claims thereto; the employer may retain a "shop right,"59 which is
an implied non-exclusive royalty-free license to use the inventionY°
An oft-quoted formulation of the shop right rule provides that
"where a servant, during his hours of employment, working with
his master's materials and appliances, conceives and perfects an in-
vention for which he obtains a patent, he must accord his master a
non-exclusive right to practice the invention. '61 In the leading de-
cision on point,62 for example, a foundry worker had invented and
patented an improved process for casting metal rollers. He had per-
fected the process by conducting experiments at the foundry, at his
employer's expense. He had also permitted his employer to utilize
the process without objection for nearly a year. On these facts, the
57. Past patent assignments can, of course, be explained, and thus the inference of an
implicitly acknowledged duty rebutted. Previous assignments for a cash reward, for example,
would strongly suggest an ad hoe opportunity rather than a binding obligation.
58. The question remains open whether or not the implied obligation includes inven-
tions unrelated to the employee's job responsibilities. Cf., eg., New Jersey Zinc Co. v.
Singmaster, 71 F.2d 277 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 591 (1934), in which a plant superin-
tendent was held to have assented to his employer's instructions that "[a]ll patentable ideas
. . . developed by an employee of this Company, while in the employ of the Company, ...
shall be formally assigned to the Company . I.." d. at 279 (emphasis supplied). The court
construed the phrase "while in the employ of" chronologically, to mean "until such time as
the employment relationship is terminated." See id. at 278. It could just as well have been
construed qualitatively, Ze., "while acting within the scope of employment."
59. The provenance of the phrase "shop right" is uncertain. It has erroneously been
stated that the phrase was first coined in United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S.
178 (1933). See Sandrock, The Evolution and Modern Application of the Shop Right Rule, 38
Bus. LAw. 953, 954 n.4 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Sandrock]. In fact, the phrase antedates
Dubilier by several decades. See Standard Parts Co. v. Peck, 264 U.S. 52, 60 (1924); Hazen
Mfg. Co. v. Wareham, 242 F. 642, 644 (6th Cir. 1917); W. ANDERSON, A DICTIONARY OF
LAW 951 (1891).
60. Hobbs v. United States, 376 F.2d 488, 494 (5th Cir. 1967).
61. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 188-89 (1933) (citations
omitted).
62. McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. (I How.) 202 (1843). Although the McClurg deci-
sion was partly premised upon statutory construction no longer relevant today, see id. at 208-
09 (construing section 7 of the Patent Act of 1839, 5 Stat. 353, 354) it is still regarded as the
seminal case expounding the shop right rule. See, e.g., Wommack v. Durham Pecan Co., 715
F.2d 962, 966-67 (5th Cir. 1983).
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Supreme Court held that the employee's assignees were precluded
from suing his employer for patent infringement. The shop right
rule is, in other words, a judicially created exception to the statu-
tory scheme of patent exclusivity.63
The shop right rule is an equitable doctrine" resting upon two
principal considerations. First, it is only fair that when an em-
ployee has used his employer's time and equipment to create an in-
vention, his employer should be able to use the invention without
paying a royalty. 65 The judicial inference of a shop right based
upon this consideration has been characterized as "equity refusing
63. Mechmetals Corp. v. Telex Computer Prod., Inc., 709 F.2d 1287, 1293 (9th Cir.
1983).
64. Id. at 1291. See, eg., Gill v. United States, 160 U.S. 426, 430 (1896). Some com-
mentators suggest that the doctrine has contractual underpinnings as well. See Sandrock,
supra note 59, at 959-60, 965-66; Note, Employer's and Employee's Rights in Patents Arising
from the Employment, 11 VILLANOVA L. REv. 823, 826 (1966). There is, indeed, judicial
language superficially supporting this view. See, eg., Solomons v. United States, 137 U.S.
343 (1890):
[W]hen one is in the employ of another in a certain line of work, and devises an
improved method or instrument for doing that work, and uses the property of
his employer and the services of other employees to develop and put in practi-
cable form his invention, and explicitly assents to the use by his employer of
such invention, a jury, or a court trying the facts, is warranted in finding that he
has so far recognized the obligations ofserviceflowingfrom his employment and
the benefits resulting from his use of the property, and the assistance of the co-
employees of his employer, as to have given to such employer an irrevocable li-
cense to use such invention.
Id. at 346 (emphasis added). Language such as that quoted above reflects not a true contrac-
tual analysis, however, but rather one premised upon quasi-contract. See Gill v. United
States, 160 U.S. 426, 430 (1896) (the parties' intent is irrelevant); id. at 435 (an employee's
express agreement to allow the use of his invention is merely "the most conclusive evidence"
of the consent need to create an estoppel). See generally supra note 49.
Nor do those cases in which employers have been denied a shop right because consul-
tants or employees refused to execute a gratuitous patent license agreement, see, e.g., Hobbs
v. United States, 376 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1967); Gemco Eng'g & Mfg. Co. v. Henderson, 151
Ohio St. 95, 84 N.E.2d 596 (1949), support a contract rationale. Rather, by thus unequivo-
cally announcing their intent not to license their patent rights, the consultants and employees
in these cases simply did not mislead their employers into assuming otherwise, an indispensa-
ble prerequisite to the equitable implication of a patent license. Eg., Minnesota Mining &
Mfg. Co. v. Blume, 533 F. Supp. 493, 517-21 (S.D. Ohio 1979), affld, 684 F.2d 1166 (6th Cir.
1982), cerL denied, 461 U.S. 939 (1983).
This is not to gainsay, of course, that the facts of a particular situation might permit the
inference that an employee has, as a matter of fact, actually albeit impliedly consented to
grant to his employer a license. Cf supra text accompanying notes 48-53 (employee's implied
assent to assign his patent right to his employer). But cf. infra text accompanying notes 240-
45 (in order to bind an employee to a contractual obligation to assign his patent rights, the
employee must receive consideration therefor). Such a situation, though, would implicate
garden variety contract principles, not the shop right rule. See Neon Signal Devices, Inc. v.
Alpha-Claude Neon Corp., 54 F.2d 793, 793-94 (W.D. Pa. 1931) (dictum). See generally 4
A. DELLER, WALKER ON PATENTS §§ 393-95 (2d ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as DELLER].
65. Hobbs v. United States, 376 F.2d 488, 495 (5th Cir. 1967).
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to help the employee bite the hand that fed him."66 Second, under
the doctrine of estoppel,67 if an employee encourages his employer
to use an invention, and then stands by and allows him to construct
and operate the new device without demanding any compensation,
it would be inequitable to allow that employee later to assert a claim
for royalties.6 8 Although there is disagreement concerning the rela-
tive significance of these two considerations,6 9 each by itself is suffi-
cient to create a shop right.
With respect to the first consideration, consider the case of
McAleer v. United States.7° Philip McAleer was employed as a
mechanic by the United States Bureau of Engraving and Printing.
His job required him to maintain the Bureau's machines for cutting
and trimming currency. Partly during working hours, partly dur-
ing leisure hours at the office and partly at home, McAleer devised a
paper-perforating machine which he constructed using Bureau
equipment and with the aid of co-employees. He then took out a
patent at government expense. McAleer was later discharged. Not
until two years after McAleer's discharge did the Bureau first begin
to use his invention. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court ruled that
the Bureau was entitled to a shop right which defeated McAleer's
patent infringement claim.7' The significance of McAleer is that its
66. Gemco Eng'g & Mfg. Co. v. Henderson, 151 Ohio St. 95, 107, 84 N.E.2d 596, 601-
02 (1949) (Taft, J., dissenting). The "risk-of-the-enterprise" doctrine, which has occasionally
been invoked in support of an implied duty to assign patent rights, see supra note 25, also
comes into play here. Thus, in Gill v. United States, 160 U.S. 426 (1896), the Supreme Court
analyzed two of its earlier shop right decisions as follows:
In neither case did the patentee risk anything but the loss of his personal exer-
tions in conceiving the invention. In both cases, there was a question whether
machines made after his idea would be successful or not, and if such machines
had proven to be impracticable, the loss would have fallen upon [his employer].
Id. at 434.
67. The doctrine of equitable estoppel requires that there be (1) actions inconsistent
with a claim later asserted; (2) a change of position by the other party in reliance upon these
actions; and (3) a resulting injury to the other party if the first party is allowed to repudiate
his previous actions. Eg., Martin Marietta Aluminum, Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 586 F.2d
143 (9th Cir. 1978).
68. Hobbs v. United States, 376 F.2d 488, 495 (5th Cir. 1967).
69. Compare Mechmetals Corp. v. Telex Computer Prod., Inc., 709 F.2d 1287, 1293
(9th Cir. 1983) ("[Tlhe basic premise justifying the creatiori of shop rights. . .[is] that the
employer should receive a share of the invention he has financed."), with Wommack v. Dur-
ham Pecan Co., 715 F.2d 962, 966 (5th Cir. 1983) ("[Ihe principal consideration in the shop
right determination is not the employer's assistance, but the employee's consent [to the em-
ployer's use of his invention].").
70. 150 U.S. 424 (1893).
71. Although a written license agreement was also at issue in McAleer, the Supreme
Court upheld the Court of Claims' determination that the case fell within the latter tribunal's
previous decisions recognizing a common law shop right in the absence of any agreement,
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facts isolate the first consideration underlying the shop right rule:
despite the absence of any evidence showing that McAleer had con-
sented to the Bureau's use of his invention, a shop right was implied
by virtue of the Bureau's investment of personnel, equipment and
money.
It appears to make little difference at which point in the inspi-
ratioi-to-patent spectrum the employer contributes. 72 Most com-
monly, employers' resources have helped transmute their
employees' abstract ideas into patentable inventions.73 Even after
an employee's idea has independently been reduced to practice,
though, his employer's assistance may suffice to create a shop
right.74 And, at the other extreme of the spectrum, it is at least
arguable that, where an employee spends an inordinate amount of
his employer's time daydreaming, 75 the employer may have a shop
right in patentable ideas conceived during these unwittingly em-
ployer-sponsored reveries.
Illustrating the second basis for the shop right rule, viz., estop-
pel, although not so much by its facts as by its analysis, is Gill v.
United States.76 Gill, a machinist with limited job responsibilities at
a federal arsenal, had designed and patented several machines to
improve ordnance handling. At his suggestion, the commanding of-
ficer authorized the construction of these machines, all of which
were then put into use at the arsenal. Gill never objected to the use
of his machines. Later, however, he filed a patent infringement suit
seeking to collect royalties for the government's use of the ma-
chines. The Supreme Court denied Gill's claim. In its opinion, the
Court stressed that the expense undertaken by the government to
and ruled that the agreement merely "secured the right to use the device. . . which right
would, under the circumstances, have otherwise been implied." Id. at 432.
72. Wommack v. Durham Pecan Co., 715 F.2d 962, 967 (5th Cir. 1983). See Gill v.
United States, 160 U.S. 426, 433-34 (1896).
73. See, eg., McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202 (1843); Franklyn v. Guilford
Packing Co., 695 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1983); Neon Signal Devices, Inc. v. Alpha-Claude Neon
Corp., 54 F.2d 793 (W.D. Pa. 1931).
74. Wommack v. Durham Pecan Co., 715 F.2d 962, 966 (5th Cir. 1983) (dictum). Cf.
McAleer v. United States, 150 U.S. 424, 428 (1893) (the employer's assistance included, inter
alia, payment of all expenses incurred in obtaining a patent).
75. The test for an "inordinate concept" of time would be a functional one, i.e. whether
or not the employee's cerebrations detract from his ability to perform the tasks assigned to
him. If so, then the employer would effectively be subsidizing the employee's mental research
efforts. If the employee's ability to handle his normal assignments remains unimpaired, on
the other hand, then the employer has received what he paid for - a full day's work - and
no reason exists to imply a shop right. This line of analysis would obviously be far easier to
apply to an employee paid by the hour than to one on salary.
76. 160 U.S. 426 (1896).
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construct the machines at his behest was merely an evidentiary mat-
ter bearing upon the pivotal issue of the estoppel arising from Gill's
consent:
The principle [of implied shop rights] is really an application or
outgrowth of the law of estoppel in pats, by which a person look-
ing on and assenting to that which he has power to prevent, is
held to be precluded ever afterwards from maintaining an action
for damages ....
[T]he fact. . . that the patentee made use of the property
and labor of the governnent in putting his conceptions into prac-
tical shape, is important only as furnishing an item of evidence
tending to show that the patentee consented to and encouraged
the government in making use of his devices. The ultimate fact
to be proven is the estoppel, arising from the consent given by the
patentee to the use of his inventions by the government, without
demand for compensation.77
The lynchpin of equitable estoppel - that the party urging es-
toppel will suffer injury if the other party is allowed to disavow the
implications of his prior conduct78 - is not always immediately
apparent where, as in Gill, mere permissive use is the basis for im-
plying a shop right. After all, even if now forced to desist from
using his former employee's invention, has not the employer en-
joyed the benefit of its use during the interim? As a practical mat-
ter, though, an employer ordered to abandon the advantages
provided by his former employee's invention will invariably sustain
some form of financial loss. Depending upon the invention, the re-
sulting losses might include the expenses of retooling, the cost of
acquiring substitute equipment79 and the loss of customer good-
will,8 0 to name a few. Frequently, moreover, former employees in
77. Id. at 430, 434-35 (original emphasis). Accord, Wommack v. Durham Pecan Co.,
715 P.2d 962 (5th Cir. 1983).
78. See supra note 67.
79. An extreme case is Neon Signal Devices, Inc. v. Alpha-Claude Neon Corp., 54 F.2d
793 (W.D. Pa. 1931). There, the employee had persuaded his employer, a manufacturer of
neon tube advertising signs, to enter an entirely new line of business - the manufacture of
traffic signals - based upon his invention. The adjustm6nt required, inter alia, that new
equipment and tools be purchased. See id. at 795. It takes little imagination to envision the
financial devastation that would have ensued had the employer been required to return to its
original line of business.
80. Most inventions worth fighting over are those which improve operating efficiency.
See, e.g., Wommack v. Durham Pecan Co., 715 F.2d 962 (5th Cir. 1983). The resulting
decrease in operating costs can translate into higher profits or lower prices. If a decision is
made to sell at lower prices, and the employer is then enjoined from using the invention, a
return to original prices will probably result. While, from a strict competitive price perspec-
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these situations seek not to enjoin the future use of their inventions,
but instead to collect royalties allegedly due for the use of their in-
ventions in the past." Where an employer has been allowed to use
his employee's invention ostensibly for free, exacting an after-the-
fact payment in this manner would clearly injure the employer.
Because of the shop right rule's equitable origins, most courts
hold that, "[w]hile it is generally true that questions of shop right
arise between employer and employee, such right is not restricted
alone to the case of an employer, as the doctrine is only a phase of
the broad doctrine of estoppel."82 Consequently, one who employs
an independent consultant is entitled to a shop right in the appro-
priate circumstances.8" Indeed, given the appropriate circum-
stances, a shop right may arise regardless of how the parties'
relationship is characterized.8 4
Even so, what has the owner of a shop right really won? As a
means of avoiding financial losses, a shop right amply serves its pur-
pose. 5 But its value as a tool for economic betterment is far less
than the value of the patent rights themselves.86 The real value of a
tive, the employer is no worse off than before he used the invention, the price increase may
cause some customers to question his reliability.
81. See, e.g., Gill v. United States, 160 U.S. 426 (1896); McAleer v. United States, 150
U.S. 424 (1893). The identity of the plaintiff in a patent infringement lawsuit often deter-
mines the relief sought. Patent assignees from inventors employed in private industry tend to
be competitors of the latters' employers. Consequently, they usually seek to enjoin the em-
ployers' use of the inventions, rather than to collect royalties. See, e.g., Neon Signal Devices,
Inc. v. Alpha-Claude Neon Corp., 54 F.2d 793 (W.D. Pa. 1931).
82. Neon Signal Devices, Inc. v. Alpha-Claude Neon Corp., 54 F.2d 793, 794 (W.D.
Pa. 1931) (dictum). Accord, Franklyn v. Guilford Packing Co., 695 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir.
1983); Gate-Way v. Hillgren, 82 F. Supp. 546 (S.D. Cal. 1949), af'd per curiam, 181 F.2d
1010 (9th Cir. 1950); Kurt H. Volk, Inc. v. Foundation for Christian Living, 534 F. Supp.
1059 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Graham-White Sales Co. v. Prime Mfg. Co., 237 F. Supp. 694 (E.D.
Wis. 1964), affd per curiam, 343 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1965); cf. Lone Star Steel Co. v. Wahl,
636 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982) (employer not entitled to shop right where independ-
ent consultant had refused to execute a patent waiver and assignment form - quaere,
whether the court's refusal to infer a nonexclusive license because of the consultant's refusal
to relinquish all his patent rights is not a non sequitur). Contra, Hobbs v. United States, 376
F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1967); Crom v. Cement Gun Co., 467 F. Supp. 403 (D. Del. 1942); cf
Farrand Optical Co. v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 230, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (dictum), affd
en banc on other grounds, 317 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1963).
83. E.g., Franklyn v. Guilford Packing Co., 695 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1983); Graham-
White Sales Co. v. Prime Mfg. Co., 237 F. Supp. 694 (E.D. Wis. 1964), aff'd per curiam, 343
F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1965).
84. Kurt H. Volk, Inc. v. Foundation for Christian Living, 534 F. Supp. 1059, 1084
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); Graham-White Sales Co. v. Prime Mfg. Co., 237 F. Supp. 694, 703 (E.D.
Wis. 1964), affd per curiam, 343 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1965).
85. See supra text accompanying notes 79-81.
86. Curiously, the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks has stated that "'shop
rights' may result in the employer reaping all economic benefits resulting from an employee's
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patent is the right which it vests in the patentee to exclude all others
from making, using or selling an invention.87 The owner of a shop
right, however, has no such power of exclusion.88 Thus he is forced
to meet the competitive use of the invention in question by his for-
mer employee or by those whom the former employee chooses to
license.89 And, without monopoly power, the shop right owner can-
not collect royalties. 90 Nor can he even license his own shop right,
for shop rights are not transferable. 91 Finally, consider the situa-
tion where an employee uses his employer's facilities to create an
invention which cannot be exploited in the employer's business. 92
In this circumstance, the economic rationale for the shop right rule
- that "the employer should receive a share in the invention he has
financed" 93 - would result in a shop right which, ironically, gives
the employer no economic benefit at all.
Nevertheless, as the plethora of lawsuits involving shop rights
indicate, shop rights are valuable, albeit substantially less so than
outright patent ownership. And a shop right does offer a cost ad-
vantage over competitors who must pay royalties in order to use the
invention. 94 At least to that extent, therefore, the shop right rule
patent." Jessel v. Newland, 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 678, 687 n.l1 (Dec. Comm'r Pat. 1977)
(dictum) (citing Standard Parts Co. v. Peck, 264 U.S. 52 (1924), in which the Supreme Court
reinstated a decree ordering the assignment of a patent from an employee hired to invent to
his former employer; shop rights were not at issue). It is doubtful, though, that much weight
can be ascribed to this manifestly off-hand remark.
87. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 202 (1933).
88. Solomons v. United States, 22 Ct. Cl. 335, 343 (1887), aft'd, 137 U.S. 342 (1890).
89. E.F. Drew & Co. v. Reinhard, 170 F.2d 679, 683 (2d Cir. 1948). If these licenses to
competitors contain sufficiently favorable price terms, they may effectively nullify the advan-
tage of the employer's shop right. Comment, Rights and Responsibilities of the Employed
Inventor, 45 IND. L.J. 254, 257 (1970).
90. Solomons v. United States, 22 Ct. CI. 335, 343 (1887), afl'd, 137 U.S. 342 (1890).
91. Eg., Franklyn v. Guilford Packing Co., 695 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1983); PP-G In-
dustries, Inc. v. Guardian Industries Corp., 597 F.2d 1090 (6th Cir. 1979). But see Neon
Signal Devices, Inc. v. Alpha-Claude Neon Corp., 54 F.2d 793 (W.D. Pa. 1932) (shop right
transferable in connection with the sale of the transferor's entire business).
92. See, e.g., Neon Signal Devices, Inc. v. Alpha-Claude Neon Corp., 54 F.2d 793
(W.D. Pa. 1932) (the employee of an advertising sign manufacturer devised an invention for
use in the traffic signal business). Although it is highly improbable that an employer would
volunteer his resources for the development of an invention which he could not exploit, an
employee might easily be able to use the employer's time and facilities without the employer's
knowledge, especially in a large corporation. Notwithstanding suggestions to the contrary,
therefore, see E. KINTNER & J. LAHR, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW PRIMER 224 (2d
ed. 1982), disclosure should not be a condition precedent to the existence of a shop right.
93. Mechmetals Corp. v. Telex Computer Prod., Inc., 709 F.2d 1287, 1293 (9th Cir.
1983).
94. Where a competitor's royalty payments are geared to the intensity of use rather
than set at a flat rate, moreover, see Hersch, Nonexistence of Set Standards for Royalty Rates,
in PRACTICAL PATENT LICENSING 80, 85 (A. Davis, Jr. ed. 1966), this advantage increases as
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has significant economic implications, as well as equitable implica-
tions, for employer and employee alike.
4. Employee Shop Rights in Employer-Owned
Inventions
When an employer is entitled to the patent on an invention
created by one of his employees, can the employee claim a shop
right? That is a question on which virtually no precedent exists. 95
And, in part for that very reason, one court has declined to recog-
nize such a right.
The principal dispute in Mainland Industries, Inc. v. Timber-
land Machines and Engineering Corp. 96 was between Mainland In-
dustries and its former chief engineer, F.L. Miller. Miller had left
Mainland to join a competitor, and had helped his new employer
manufacture a patented knife that he had invented while in Main-
land's employ. Mainland then successfully filed an action seeking
to compel Miller to assign the patent to it. The trial court, however,
allowed Miller a lifetime shop right to use the patented knife. On
appeal, this was held to be improper. The Oregon Court of Appeals
pointed out that no precedent existed for applying the shop right in
favor of an employee, and that, moreover, the equities traditionally
supporting the creation of a shop right were lacking in the case
before it:
The rationale for the [shop right] rule is that because the patent
resulted from use of the employer's property and from labor for
which the employee was paid by his employer, it is equitable that
the employer share in the invention . . . . [T]he facts here do
not warrant application of the doctrine. As Mainland's chief en-
gineer, Miller's duties included solving problems in the use of his
employer's products. If a solution was possible, it was his duty
to find it. Having already received a substantial salary from
Mainland to invent, design and develop products and improve-
ments, Miller now has no equitable claim to a license. 97
The reasoning in Mainland seems eminently sound. In the rare
the stakes become higher. Conversely, of course, the advantage decreases at higher produc-
tion levels where the royalties are set at a flat rate. See R. NORDHAUS, PATENT LICENSING
AGREEMENTS § 19 (1967).
95. A relatively greater body of authority, although still few in number, has addressed
the right of ehnployees to claim a shop right in trade secrets. See infra notes 149-50 and
accompanying text.
96. 58 Or. App. 585, 649 P.2d 613, petition for review denied, 293 Or. 801, 653 P.2d 999
(1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
97. Id. at 1051, 649 P.2d at 618 (footnote omitted).
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case where an employee implicitly assents to convey his patent
rights to his employer, and where he has spent his own money cre-
ating the invention at issue, a tenable shop right argument might
perhaps be advanced under the investment rationale for the shop
right rule.98 But, in the vast majority of situations where employers
are entitled to patents on their employee's inventions, the employer
rather than the employee makes the investment.
The equitable estoppel rationale offers even less support for an
employee shop right. It is difficult, after all, to imagine how an em-
ployee who is hired to invent, or who has agreed to assign his inven-
tions to his employer, could reasonably be induced by his
employer's silence to use an invention in the belief that the em-
ployer intended to allow him to use it forever and for free.
The paucity of authority on point precludes any categorical as-
sertions concerning the status of the law on employee shop rights.
With this caveat, though, and with the further caveat that a small
group of apparently contrary trade secret cases exists,99 it may
safely be predicted that an employee will seldom succeed in claim-
ing a shop right in those of his inventions which belong to his
employer.
B. Trade Secrets
Before considering whether or not the answers to the various
questions of ownership change as the focus shifts from patents to
trade secrets, 1° it should be observed that the questions themselves
change slightly, for no one can truly "own" a trade secret. A patent
is a statutory right which vests the patentee with a traditional indi-
cium of ownership: 1° ' as a reward for disclosing his invention, the
patentee is given the right to exclude all others from using his in-
vention for the life of the patent." 2 Trade secrets, on the other
98. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
99. See infra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
100. A trade secret is "any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which
is used in one's business, and which gives him the opportunity to obtain an advantage over
competitors who do not know. . . it .. " RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b
(1939). The owner of a trade secret has no legally cognizable interest in the idea itself; rather,
its value lies in the competitive advantage which it provides. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co.
v. United States, 288 F.2d 904, 911 (Ct. Cl. 1961). But see Affiliated Hosp. Prod., Inc. v.
Baldwin, 57 Ill. App. 3d 800, 373 N.E.2d 1000 (1978) (information was a trade secret even
though it had not yet been put to commercial use).
101. See Coffman v. Federal Laboratories, 171 F.2d 94, 101 (1948), cerL denied, 336 U.S.
913 (1949).
102. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933). The life of a
patent is 17 years. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982).
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hand, as their name suggests, exist by virtue of nondisclosure.10 3
Like ether when exposed to sunlight, trade secret status evaporates
once the information is made public."° Consequently, a person
possessing knowledge of a trade secret cannot prohibit others from
discovering and using it;t' 5 he can prohibit only the use and disclo-
sure of a misappropriated trade secret'06 - that is, one acquired by
improper means such as theft' 07 or the breach of a nondisclosure
agreement 0 8 - and even then he can ofttimes prohibit its use only
for as long a period of time as it would have taken the defendant to
"reverse engineer"' 0 9 the trade secret or to have developed it in-
dependantly solely on the basis of information available to the gen-
eral public.'t 0 When we speak of trade secret "ownership,"
therefore, it should be borne in mind that we are really talking
about little more than the right to be protected against
misappropriation. ' 1
1. Persons Hired to Invent
As they have held with regard to patents," t2 most courts hold
that a trade secret created by an employee who is hired to invent
belongs to his employer, whether that employee is engaged in gen-
eral research" 3 or has been assigned to a particular project." 4
103. Computer Print Systems, Inc. v. Lewis, 281 Pa. Super. 240, 252, 422 A.2d 148, 154
(1980) ("[C]ontinued secrecy is the sine qua non to maintenance of trade secret protection
104. National Starch Prod., Inc. v. Polymer Indus., Inc., 273 App. Div. 732, 735, 79
N.Y.S.2d 357, 360 (1948). Limited disclosure in order to exploit the trade secret, however,
will not destroy the right to legal protection. See, eg., Board of Trade v. Christie Grain &
Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 247 (1905) (distribution to 1,800 members of commodity exchange
did not impair validity of trade secret); Data General Corp. v. Digital Computer Controls,
Inc., 357 A.2d 105, 108 (Del. Ch. 1975) (distribution to 6,000 vendors and customers who
signed secrecy agreements did not impair validity of trade secret).
105. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974).
106. Junker v. Plummer, 320 Mass. 76, 80, 67 N.E.2d 667, 670 (1946).
107. See, eg., University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518 (5th
Cir. 1974).
108. See, e.g., Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v. Eng'g Mechanics Research Corp.,
401 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
109. "Reverse engineering" is the technique of "starting with the known product and
working backward to devise the process which aided in the development or manufacture."
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974).
110. See, eg., Hampton v. Blair Mfg. Co., 374 F.2d 969 (8th Cir. 1967); K-2 Ski Co. v.
Head Ski Co., 506 F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1974). This form of injunction preserves the "head
start" value of a trade secret. See Analogic Corp. v. Data Translation, Inc., 371 Mass. 643,
647, 358 N.E.2d 804, 808 (1976). But see, ag., Data General Corp. v. Digital Computer
Controls, Inc., 357 A.2d 105 (Del. Ch. 1975) (issuing permanent injunction).
111. Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 577, 160 A.2d 430, 437 (1960).
112. See supra text accompanying notes 20-29.
113. Eg., Basic Chemicals, Inc. v. Benson, 251 N.W.2d 220 (Iowa 1977); B.F. Goodrich
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These courts apply the general principle of employee trade secret
misappropriation - that employees1 5 and independent contrac-
torst'1 6 owe an implied duty to their employers not to use or disclose
trade secrets learned on the job'17 - to employees who themselves
created the trade secrets. In Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlein, I" for
example, several Sperry Rand research engineers left Sperry Rand
to form the National Semiconductor Corporation; with them they
took Sperry Rand's secret process for the commercial production of
silicon alloy junction transistors. Even though these former em-
ployees were entirely responsible for creating this process, the court
held that they had misappropriated Sperry Rand's trade secret:
"The fact that it was the defendants who developed the process
gives them no greater right to use it in competition with the plaintiff
than that of any other employee."1 1 9
The law in this area, however, is not completely settled. 2
Some courts, recognizing that the close balance of competing policy
considerations121 shifts when the employee himself has created the
Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 117 Ohio App. 493, 192 N.E.2d 99 (1963). See also National Surety
Corp. v. Applied Systems, 418 So. 2d 847, 849 (Ala. 1982) (holding, in an action alleging that
the plaintiff's former employee had converted a computer program, that "even though [the
defendant] developed the program, he did not have any property rights or interest in the
programs. He developed the programs for [the plaintiff], which facilitated the development
of the programs and provided financial backing.").
114. Eg., E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. American Potash & Chemical Corp., 200
A.2d 428 (Del. Ch. 1964); Vigitron, Inc. v. Ferguson, 120 N.H. 626, 419 A.2d 1115 (1980).
11-5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1958). See supra notes 10-11 and
accompanying text. An employer may not, however, restrain an employee from using his
skill, knowledge and general experience gained on the job. Eg., Levine v. E.A. Johnson &
Co., 107 Cal. App. 2d 322, 325, 237 P.2d 309, 312 (1951).
116. See, e.g., Crocan Corp. v. Sheller-Globe Corp., 385 F. Supp. 251 (N.D. IM. 1974).
An implied duty of confidentiality arises in other contexts as well. See, e.g., University Com-
puting Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1974) (joint venture); Charles
M. Reeder & Co. v. Interpart Corp., 558 F.2d 351 (6th Cir. 1977) (prospective licensor-
licensee relationship).
117. Unlike the implied duty to assign patents, however, this implied duty arises out of
quasi-contract, not contract-in-fact. Cataphote Corp. v. Hudson, 422 F.2d 1290, 1292 (5th
Cir. 1970); Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v. Eng'g Mechanics Research Corp., 401 F.
Supp. 1102, 1111 (E.D. Mich. 1975). See supra note 49.
118. 241 F. Supp. 549 (D. Conn. 1964).
119. Id. at 564-65.
120. Compare, e.g., Chicago Lock Co. v. Fanberg, 676 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1982) (lock-
smith whom lock owner hired to reverse engineer secret tumbler combination of lock manu-
facturer owed a duty of nondisclosure to the lock owner) (dictum), with Wexler v. Greenberg,
399 Pa. 569, 160 A.2d 430 (1960) (chemist whom manufacturer hired to reverse engineer
secret chemical formulas of a competitor owed no duty of nondisclosure to the
manufacturer).
121. The inherent tension in accommodating the employer's interests, the employee's
interests, and society's interests as a whole reflects the fact that while the disclosure of infor-
mation is favored, excessive disclosure can be too much of a good thing. Disclosure is fa-
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trade secret, 122 have refused to imply a duty of non-use and nondis-
closure under these circumstances. Thus, in Structural Dynamics
Research Corp. v. Eng'g Corp. v. Eng'g Mechanics Research
Corp., 123 a case in which two employees hired to write a structural
analysis software program began using the program on behalf of a
new employer, the court distinguished the facts before it from the
far more common situation in which an employee merely learns
about a trade secret from his employer. Employed inventors, ruled
the court, are entitled to use and disclose trade secrets after they
change jobs:
If the subject matter of the trade secret is in being and an em-
ployee learns about it in the course of his employment in a rela-
tionship of confidence, the duty not to use or disclose trade secret
knowledge adversely to his employer arises. On the other hand,
if the subject matter of the trade secret is brought into being be-
cause of the initiative of the employee in its creation, innovation
or development even though the relationship is one of confi-
dence, no duty arises since the employee may then have an inter-
est in the subject matter at least equal to that of his employer or
in any event, such knowledge is a part of the employee's skill and
experience. In such a case, absent an express contractual obliga-
tion by the employee not to use or disclose such confidential in-
formation acquired during his employment adverse to his
employer's interest, he is free to use or disclose it in subsequent
employment activity.1 24
There are a few decisions in accord with Structural Dynam-
voted, because it helps to disseminate knowledge; excessive disclosure, however, is disfavored,
because it reduces the economic incentives for innovation. Structural Dynamics Research
Corp. v. Eng'g Mechanics Research Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1102, 1110 (E.D. Mich. 1975). Em-
ployee mobility is also encouraged because, in theory at least, it maximizes the likelihood that
employees will become most productively employed. Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282
Md. 31, 37, 382 A.2d 564, 568-69 (1978). On the other hand, with the growth of larger
business organizations, the resulting dispersion of responsibility has made it essential that
confidential information be entrusted to a greater number of employees. And an optimal
amount of entrusting will not occur without sufficient legal bulwarks against unauthorized
disclosure. Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 578, 160 A.2d 430, 435 (1960).
"[M]aintaining decent standards of morality in the business community" has also been ad-
vanced as a reason for restricting the disclosure of information confided to employees. See
Western Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 138 (9th Cir. 1965).
122. See Developments in the Law- Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REV. 888, 951 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Developments] ("[I]f the employee has himself helped to develop the
trade secret, this. . . weighs against protection, since he may have some claim to ownership
himself.").
123. 401 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
124. Id. at 1111. The court nevertheless entered a judgment against the former employ-
ees, on the ground that they had violated a written nondisclosure agreement. See id. at 1116.
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ic, I" but the vast majority follow the classic patent "hired to in-
vent" rule.'26 As a general proposition, therefore, the observations
made earlier concerning the ownership of inventions devised by em-
ployees hired to invent127 pertain in full measure to trade secrets as
well.
2. Persons Impliedly Assenting Not to Use or Disclose
Trade Secrets.
Because trade secrets cannot legally be "owned" as such, 2 ' the
ownership of trade secrets cannot be assigned.' 29 Of course, since
most lawful agreements can be implied from the parties' conduct,
130
no reason exists why employees cannot by their conduct acknowl-
edge a contractual duty not to use or disclose their employers' trade
secrets. 13 1 There appears, however, to be no case law directly so
holding.'32
As a practical matter, much the same result occurs by virtue of
the implied duty owed by employees and independent consultants
not to use or to disclose trade secrets revealed to them by their em-
ployers.' 33  In this manner, the employees and consultants are
125. See Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 160 A.2d 430 (1960); Hickory Specialties,
Inc. v. B & L Labs, Inc. 592 S.W.2d 583, 587 (Tenn. App. 1979) (dictum); cf. B.F. Gladding
& Co. v. Scientific Anglers, Inc., 245 F.2d 722 (6th Cir. 1957) (a consulting engineering firm
which jointly developed a trade secret with its employer was held entitled to use the trade
secret-a fortiori, had the consultant developed the trade secret by itself). See also Develop-
ments, supra note 122, at 951. But see Case Comment, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1473 (1961) (criti-
cizing the Wexler decision).
126. See supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text. See also Trade Secrets, supra note
18, at 839-41 (analyzing cases involving computer programs).
127. See supra text accompanying notes 20-47.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 100-11.
129. Many courts uphold "agreements for the sale and license of trade secrets .
Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 225 (2d Cir. 1971). See generally 12 R. MIL-
GRIM, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 1.02 (1984) [hereinafter cited as MILGRIM]. A closer
examination of the agreements involved, however, reveals that in fact they merely regulate
competition and disclosure, and do not purport actually to transfer ownership of the "as-
signor's" knowledge. See, e.g., Heltra, Inc. v. Richen-Gemco, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 346, 348
(D.S.C. 1975) ("[The plaintiff agreed that it would no longer engage directly or indirectly in
the manufacture, production or sale of any product to which the yarn processing apparatus in
question related nor disclose or make known to any third party any of its confidential infor-
mation in the field"), rev'd, 540 F.2d 1235 (4th Cir. 1976).
130. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 comment a (1981). Merely be-
cause an unwritten agreement is valid, however, does not always guarantee that it will be
enforced. See, eg., Myers v. Waverly Fabrics, 101 A.D.2d 77, 475 N.Y.S. 2d 860 (1984)
(non-exclusive license to reproduce copyrighted fabric pattern held unenforceable because of
the Statute of Frauds).
131. 12 MILGRIM, supra note 129, § 5.02[4], at 5-43.
132. Id.
133. See supra notes 115-16.
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deemed effectively to have agreed that their employers are to retain
as many ownership rights in the trade secrets as the law recognizes.
And, in most instances, 134 employees and consultants who actually
develop the trade secrets are encompassed within this rule.
3. Employer Shop Rights in Employee-Owned
Inventions
Whether the shop right rule 135 applies to trade secrets is a
problematic issue, although at least one court seems to have as-
sumed that it does apply. The plaintiff in Kinkade v. New York
Shipbuilding Corp. 136 had formerly worked for the defendant ship-
building company as a tinsmith. He had been assigned to a crew
whose task was to install bunks in troop ships. While so engaged,
he conceived an idea for relocating the hooks on the metal straps
used to fasten bunks to the bulkhead so as to simplify the installa-
tion process, and thereby reduce labor costs. He and several fellow
employees in the company tinshop, using company materials, con-
structed a number of these redesigned straps, one of which he
helped to install in a ship under construction. Up to this point, the
plaintiff had been paid under an incentive system: he was paid on
the basis of the estimated time for each particular task; if he man-
aged to accomplish the task in less time, he was paid for the esti-
mated time anyway. In a perverse twist of irony, the defendant
shipbuilding company then reduced the plaintiff's incentive rates by
two-thirds, to account for the efficiencies introduced by his inven-
tion. Understandably angered, the plaintiff quit and filed suit to re-
cover damages for the defendant's use of his metal strap design.
The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected his claim, reasoning that
the defendant had acquired a shop right. In so ruling, the court
found that the plaintiff's invention qualified as a trade secret,1 37 and
declared that the shop right rule controlled "whether or not the
idea is patentable ....
Notwithstanding Kinkade, certain analytical problems arise in
attempting to apply the shop right rule in a trade secret context.
Suppose, for example, that an employee develops a secret process on
134. See supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 123-25 and
accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 59-94 and accompanying text.
136. 21 N.J. 362, 122 A.2d 360 (1956).
137. See id. at 369, 122 A.2d at 363. But cf. id. at 366, 122 A.2d at 363. ("[W]e do not
consider the facts here can be disposed of [sic] by the principles applicable to trade secrets but
rather it is controlled by.. . the 'shop right rule'.").
138. Id. at 368, 122 A.2d at 365.
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his employer's time using his employer's facilities, yet never dis-
closes this fact to his employer. Obviously, absent such disclosure,
there can be no permissive use by the employer. It has been sug-
gested that, in this situation, the employee has acquired no trade
secret because the secret has not been used to a competitive advan-
tage, and hence that the employer can acquire no shop right
therein. 139
This concern, however, overlooks the origins of, and hence un-
derestimates the potential breadth of, the shop right rule. The shop
right rule, it should be remembered, is a creature of equity."4° And
equitable doctrines do not depend upon property classifications.14
Hence equity imposes upon employees a duty not to disclose infor-
mation revealed to them in confidence by their employers, even
though this information does not rise to the level of a trade se-
cret. 42 In the same spirit of flexibility, no reason appears why an
employer ought not, under the proper circumstances, to have a shop
right to use employee inventions regardless of how those inventions
are pigeonholed for property law purposes.1 43 Where an employee
countenances his employer's use of an invention, the case for a shop
right in trade secrets becomes even stronger.
Again, though, the dearth of authority on point precludes any
facile conclusions. The only truly accurate assertion concerning the
state of the law in this area is that it is presently uncertain. 144
4. Employee Shop Rights in Employer-Owned
Inventions
Because the crux of a trade secret dispute is use and disclosure
rather than ownership,1 45 the cases addressing the respective rights
of employees and employers where the latter are held to be the own-
ers of employee-developed trade secrets'" would seem dispositive of
139. See 12 MILGRIM, supra note 129, § 5.02[4], at 5-47. See generally supra note 100.
140. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
141. H. MCCLINTOCK, EQuITY § 3-21, 46 (West 1948). See e.g., Extrin Foods, Inc. v.
Leighton, 202 Misc. 592, 598, 115 N.Y.S.2d 429, 434 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (injunction prohibiting
misappropriation of trade secrets was "predicated on the breach of this [implied] duty [of
non-disclosure] rather than on a specific property right of the plaintiff.").
142. See supra note 19.
143. Although it has been theorized that requiring the employee to disclose his secret to
his employer for shop right purposes might jeopardize trade secret status, see 12 MILGRIM,
supra note 129, § 5.02[4], at 47, this seems unlikely; for such a limited disclosure would most
certainly be privileged. See supra note 104.
144. 12 MILGRIM, supra note 129, § 5.02[4], at 5-46 to 5-47.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 100-11.
146. See supra notes 113-14, 118-20, 123-25.
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an employee's right to use such trade secrets. And, for all practical
purposes, they are.
In theory, a distinction may be drawn between an employee's
full "ownership" rights in a trade secret, on the one hand, and his
license to use it, on the other. Full ownership rights in a trade se-
cret entitle the owner both to use it, and also freely to disclose it. 147
Arguably, a license to use a trade secret, while likewise allowing the
licensee to use it, authorizes only such limited disclosures as are
necessary to use it. 4 ' The difference, in other words, is in the right
of disclosure.
On close scrutiny, though, the distinction fades. Why, after
all, would a trade secret owner reveal his secret except in order to
exploit it? Accordingly, those decisions holding that employees
hired to invent nonetheless have "an unqualified privilege to use" 
149
trade secrets which they invent in the course of their employment'5"
lend support to the view that such employees are entitled to a shop
right in trade secrets. The vast majority of cases enjoining former
employees from using or disclosing trade secrets which they in-
vented, 51 however, suggests that this view is seldom likely to
prevail.
C. Copyright
Under the Copyright Act of 1976 ("the 1976 Act"),' 52 copy-
right ownership vests in the author' 53 of a copyrightable work.' 54
147. Cf. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904, 911 (Ct. CI.
1961) (trade secret owner has a monopoly and can completely convey to others the knowl-
edge needed to use his secret).
148. Cf. Kinkade v. New York Shipbuilding Corp., 21 N.J. 362, 366, 122 A.2d 360, 363
(1956) (finding that disclosure of a trade secret to the plaintiff's fellow employees "was neces-
sary for without such there could have been no use of the [trade secret] . . .
149. Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 577, 160 A.2d 430, 437 (1960).
150. See supra notes 123-25.
151. See supra notes 113-14, 118-19.
152. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982). The 1976 Act is premised upon Congress' power
under Article I, § 8, cl. 8 of the United States Constitution, see supra note 20, and applies to
works created on or after January 1, 1978. Roth v. Pritikin, 710 F.2d 934 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 393 (1983); Sargent v. American Greetings Corp., 588 F. Supp. 912 (N.D.
Ohio 1984).
153. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1982). Although the 1976 Act does not define "author," the
term usually denotes that person who created the work in question. See, e.g., Burrow-Giles
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (photographer is "author" of a
photograph).
154. Copyright "subsists. . .in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible me-
dium of expression ...." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). In order to be copyrightable, a work
must at some point have been reduced to a physical expression, Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
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This is similar to the rule regarding patents. 1 55 Unlike patents,
though, the allocation of copyright ownership between employers
and employees is not relegated to common law.
Section 201(b) of the 1976 Act explicitly provides that an em-
ployer is deemed to be author of all "work[s] made for hire":
In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person
for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for
purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly
agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them owns all
of the rights comprised in the copyrights.
15 6
A work made for hire, in turn, is defined as:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or
her employment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contri-
bution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a
compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material
for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written
instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a
work made for hire. 1
57
The resolution of a copyright dispute between employer and inven-
tor, in other words, depends upon whether or not a particular work
fits within either of the two classifications quoted above. If so, then
the employer is considered the author, and owns the copyright in its
entirety; if not, then the inventor is considered the author, and he
instead owns the copyright in its entirety. The outcome is appar-
ently winner-take-all, for Congress deliberately omitted from the
1976 Act a proposed amendment that would have adopted the shop
tem, Inc. v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315 (lst Cir. 1967); for it is the expression rather than the
underlying idea which is copyrightable. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
155. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
156. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1982). In addition to vesting copyright ownership in the em-
ployer, concluding that a work is one "made for hire" has at least three other consequences.
First, it affects the duration of copyright. Copyright in a work ordinarily endures from the
creation of the work until fifty years after the author's death. Id. § 302(a). But, if the work is
one made for hire, copyright endures from the creation of the work either until seventy-five
years from first publication, see id. § 101 (defining "publication"), or for one hundred years,
whichever period of time expires first. Id. § 302(c). Second, whereas a copyright transfer or
license can generally be terminated under certain conditions, see id. § 203, these termination
provisions do not apply to works made for hire. Id. § 203(a). And third, the nationality or
domicile of the author may determine whether or not the work in question is subject to the
1976 Act. See id. § 104(b). It thus becomes essential to know who the author is. See eg.,
Olympia Press v. Lancer Books, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 920 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See also infra text
accompanying notes 213-14.
157. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
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right rule.1 58
1. Works Prepared by an Employee within the Scope
of Employment
Presumptively,"5 9 the copyright in a work prepared by an em-
ployee within the scope of employment vests in his employer. 6
This raises two obvious questions: (1) who is an employee, and (2)
when are works prepared in the scope of employment?
Who Is an Employee? The test used to determine whether or
not the creator of a copyrightable work is an employee differs little
from the common law test used in the patent and trade secret con-.
texts. 161 Many factors are relevant: whether the parties had an ar-
rangement going beyond the assignor-assignee relationship prior to
the undertaking of the particular work, whether the putative em-
ployee receives a regular wage or salary, whether he created the
particular work on his employer's premises and whether he can be
discharged at will, among others.1 62 Virtually all of these factors,
however, pale in significance1 63 compared to whether or not the em-
158. Representatives of screenwriter and composer groups had urged that employers be
granted a shop right in works made for hire, rather than complete copyright ownership. See
e.g., Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, HR. 6831, and H.R. 6835, before Subcommittee No.
3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1., at 271-77 (1966)
(comments on behalf of the Composers and Lyricists Guild of America). This proposal was
rejected on the ground that its speculative benefits could not justify unsettling the established
rule that the copyright in a work for hire vests in the employer. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 121 (1976) [hereinafter cited as House Report], reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5736-37.
Merely because Congress declined to adopt the shop right rule as an alternative to vest-
ing employers with copyright ownership of works made for hire, of course, does not necessar-
ily compel the conclusion that it intended to preclude the courts from implying a shop right
with respect to works not made for hire in the appropriate circumstances. Cf. Boucicault v.
Fox, 3 Fed. Cas. 977, 980 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 1,691) (employer of author of play not
written for hire might be entitled to a license to have the play performed) (dictum); Everts v.
Arkham House Publishers, Inc., 579 F. Supp 145, 149, (W.D. Wis. 1984) (decided under the
Copyright Act of 1909) (publisher of collection of poems not written for hire might be enti-
fled to a license to publish the collection) (dictum). But see 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, § 5.03[B][2][d], at 5-26.1 (1984) [hereinafter cited as NIMMER].
159. The parties may, however, "expressly agree otherwise. ... 17 U.S.C. § 201(b)
(1982).
160. Id. §§ 101 (defining a "work made for hire"), 201(b).
161. Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P.C. v. Empire Constr. Co., 542 F. Supp. 252, 257
(D. Neb. 1982); 1 NIMMER, supra note 158, § 5.03[B][l][a], at 5-12.1 to 5-13. See supra note
15.
162. Picture Music v. Bourne, Inc., 314 F. Supp 640, 650-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd, 457
F.2d 1213 (2d Cir. 1972).
163. Consider, for example, the payment of a regular wage or salary. While this is pro-
bative of an employer-employee relationship, Von Tizler v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 53 F.
Supp 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), affid sub nom. Gumm v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 158 F.2d 516
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ployer had the right to exercise control over the manner in which
the work was created. 1" This is "the crucial factor." '165 The
greater the employer's right to determine the style and content of a
particular work, therefore, the greater the likelihood that the person
who created the work will be deemed an employee.1 66 And, con-
versely, the less the employer's right to determine style and content,
the less likely this result will become.1
67
Wien Are Works Prepared within the Scope of Employment?
Although the 1976 Act does not define "scope of employment,"
Congress evidently intended to adopt the common law standard 168
discussed earlier.' 69 As was the case in defining "employee," many
factors are relevant, such as at whose insistence and expense the
work was created,1 70 and on whose time.' 7' But once again, these
(2d Cir. 1946), other modes of payment have also been held consistent with such a relation-
ship. See, eg., Murray v. Gelderman, 566 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1978) (share of profits); Fred
Fisher Music Co. v. Leo Feist, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) (advance against royal-
ties); Tobani v. Carl Fischer, Inc., 36 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1937) (piece work basis),
modified on other grounds, 98 F.2d 57 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 305 U.S. 650 (1938). Indeed,
the creator of a work can be deemed an employee even though he receives no compensation at
all. See, e.g., Town of Clarkstown v. Reeder, 566 F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
164. 1 NIMMER, supra note 158, § 5.03[B][1][a], at 5-12 to 5-13; Angel and Tannen-
baum, Works Made For Hire Under S. 22, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 209, 222-23 (1976) [here-
inafter cited as.Angel and Tannenbaum]. This right to control need not actually be exercised;
it suffices that the right merely exists. Murray v. Gelderman, 566 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1978);
Town of Clarksville v. Reeder, 566 F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
165. Aldon Accessories, Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548, 551-52, (2nd. Cir.) Cert.
den., 55 U.S.L.W. 3342 (U.S. Nov. 5, 1984); Galley House, Inc. v. Yi, 1984 COPYRIGHT L.
REP. (CCH) 25,685, at 19,062 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Town of Clarksville v. Reeder, 566 F. Supp.
137, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Skyee v. Roulo, 122 Ill. App. 3d 331, 334, 461 N.E.2d 480, 483
(1984).
166. See, eg., Sigwart v. Ringling Bros. and Barnum and Bailey Circus World, Inc.,
1984 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 25,717 (C.D. Cal. 1984); Town of Clarksville v. Reeder,
566 F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
167. See, eg., Schmid Brothers, Inc. v. W. Goebel Porzellanfabrik KG., 589 F. Supp.
497 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Olympia Press v. Lancer Books, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 920 (S.D.N.Y.
1967).
168. Angel & Tannenbaum, supra note 164, at 221-22.
169. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
170. Compare, e.g., Murray v. Gelderman, 566 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1978) (employee who
wrote menu book at employer's insistence and expense was acting within the scope of em-
ployment), with Public Affairs, Inc. v. Rickover, 268 F. Supp. 444 (D.D.C. 1967) (employee
who wrote speeches on his own initiative, and with negligible assistance from his employer,
acted beyond the scope of employment).
171. Compare, e.g., Scherr v. Universal Match Corp., 417 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1969) (em-
ployees who built statue during working hours acted within the scope of employment), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 936 (1970), with Public Affairs, Inc. v. Rickover, 268 F. Supp. 444 (D.D.C.
1967) (employee who wrote lectures after working hours acted beyond the scope of employ-
ment). But see Williams v. Weisser, 273 Cal. App. 2d 726, 739, 78 Cal. Rptr. 542, 549 (1969)
(holding that a university professor rather than the university which employed him owned
the copyright to his lectures, but refusing to rely upon the fact that the lectures were largely
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factors are vastly overshadowed in importance by the question of
the employer's right to control the manner in which the work was
created. 172 Consequently, as a practical matter, the right-of-control
criterion is dispositive concerning whether or not a particular work
was prepared by an employee in the course of employment.
2. Works Prepared by an Independant Contractor on
Special Order or Commission
At common law, where an independent contractor had been
commissioned to create a work, it was presumed - absent a clear
showing of the parties' contrary intent - that copyright in the re-
sulting work was to be owned exclusively by the commissioning
party.1 73 The Copyright Act of 1909 ("the 1909 Act") 174 was silent
on this point.1 75 Consequently, with few exceptions, 176 the courts
interpreting the 1909 Act continued the presumption of ownership
in favor of the commissioning party. 177
The 1976 Act, however, radically altered the status quo.
1 78
Now, in order for a work prepared by an independent contractor to
constitute a "work made for hire," all of three criteria must be satis-
fied. First, the work must have been "specially ordered or commis-
prepared outside regular working hours, because the practice among professors of preparing
for a class at irregular hours made the distinction between work hours and off-duty hours
"illusory"); supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
172. Scherr v. Universal Match Corp., 417 F.2d 497, 500-01 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 963 (1970).
173. E.g., Dielman v. White, 102 F. 892, 894 (C.C.D. Mass. 1900).
174. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-32, 101-16, 201-16 (1970), amended by Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat.
2541 (1976).
175. Angel & Tannenbaum, supra note 164, at 228. Section 26 of the 1909 Act, 17
U.S.C. § 26 (1970), provided that "the word 'author' shall include an employer in the case of
works made for hire." Unlike the 1976 Act, however, the 1909 Act did not define "works
made for hire." Cf Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 640, 649 (S.D.N.Y.
1970) ("[the law is unclear as to precisely what constitutes an employment for hire.").
176. See, eg., W.H. Anderson Co. v. Baldwin Law Publishing Co., 27 F.2d 82 (6th Cir.
1928).
177. See, eg., Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing Corp., 369 F.2d 565 (2d
Cir. 1966); Lin-Brook Builders Hardware v. Gertler, 352 F.2d 298 (9th Cir. 1965); Morton v.
Raphael, 334 Ill. App. 399, 79 N.E.2d 522 (1948); Douglas v. Stokes, 149 Ky. 506, 149 S.W.
849 (1912).
178. May v. Morganelli-Heumann & Assoc., 618 F.2d 1363, 1368 n.4 (9th Cir. 1980);
Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P.C. v. Empire Construction Co., 542 F. Supp. 252, 257 (D.
Neb. 1982); Childers v. High Society Magazine, Inc., 557 F. Supp. 978, 984 (S.D.N.Y.), reh 'g
granted, 561 F. Supp. 1374 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). But see O'Meara, Works Made for Hire Under
the Copyright Act of,1976- Two Interpretations, 15 CREIGHTON L. REV. 523 (1982) [herein-
after cited as O'Meara]; cf Arthur Retlaw & Associates, Inc. v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc.,
582 F. Supp. 1010, 1013-14, (N.D. Il. 1984) (mistakenly applying precedent interpreting the
1909 Act to Section 201(b) of the 1976 Act).
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sioned for use." Second, the work must fit within certain prescribed
categories. And third, the parties must agree in writing that the
work is to be considered a work made for hire.'
79
Works "Specially Ordered or Commissioned for Use. " The spe-
cial order or commission requirement focuses upon the party at
whose initiative and expense the work in question was commenced.
"If [an independent contractor] is solicited by a patron to execute a
commission for pay, the presumption should be indulged that the
patron desires to control the publication of copies ... ."18o This
requirement is designed to exclude situations in which an independ-
ent contractor creates a copyrightable work on his own initiative,
and for his own purposes.'
Works Fitting with the Prescribed Categories. Whereas copy-
right ownership in a commissioned work was previously a function
of the parties' intent,18 2 now copyright in only nine categories of
works can vest in the commissioning party,1 83 regardless of the par-
ties' intent.1 84 These categories are: (1) a contribution to a collec-
179. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
180. Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co., Inc., 108 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 309
U.S. 686 (1940).
181. Compare, eg., Lumiere v. Robertson-Cole Distributing Corp., 280 F. 550 (2d Cir.)
(where a photographer is requested to take a photograph and is paid for his efforts, copyright
in the resulting photograph belongs to the requesting party), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 583
(1922), with Lumiere v. Pathe Exchange, Inc., 275 F. 428 (2d Cir. 1921) (where a photogra-
pher takes a photograph on his own initiative, at his own expense and for his own benefit,
copyright in the resulting photograph belongs to the photographer) (dictum).
182. E.g., Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing Corp., 369 F.2d 565, 568
(2d Cir. 1966); Sargent v. American Greetings Corp., 588 F. Supp. 912, 921-22 (N.D. Ohio
1984).
183. Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847, 854 (D.N.J. 1981); Childers v. High Society
Magazine, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 1374, 1375 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). The designation of limited catego-
ries of works that would qualify as "works made for hire" was a result of legislative
compromise:
The status of works prepared on special order or commission was a major issue
in the development of the definition of "works made for hire" in section 101,
which has undergone extensive revision during the legislative process. The ba-
sic problem is how to draw a statutory line between those works written on
special order or commission that should be considered as "works made for
hire," and those that should not. The definition now provided by the bill repre-
sents a compromise which, in effect, spells out those specific catagories of com-
missioned works that can be considered "works made for hire" under certain
circumstances.
House Report, supra note 158, at 121, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
5737.
184. Angel & Tannenbaum, supra note 164, at 232. Of course, if the parties truly desire
a result at odds with the statutory vesting scheme, they can always so provide by written
agreement. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1981).
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tive work;1"5 (2) a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual
work;'8 6 (3) a translation; (4) a supplementary work;"8 7 (5) a compi-
lation;' (6) an instructional text;189 (7) a test; (8) answer material
for a test; and (9) an atlas. Precisely because they do not fit within
any of the foregoing categories, architectural drawings,, 9" photo-
graphs' 9' and fabric designs 192 prepared by independent contractors
have all been held not to qualify as "works for hire," thereby vest-
ing copyright ownership in the independent contractor.1 93
185. A "collective work" is defined as "a work, such as a periodical issue, anthology, or
encyclopedia, in which a number of contributions, constituting a separate and independent
works in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
186. "Audiovisual works" are defined as:
[W]orks that consist of a series of related images which are intrinsically in-
tended to be shown by the use of machines or devices such as projectors, view-
ers, or electronic equipment, together with accompanying sounds, if any,
regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as films or tapes, in which
the works are embodied.
Id. Video games, for example, are considered to be audiovisual works. Midway Mfg. Co. v.
Arctic Int'l, 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983).
187. A "supplementary work" is defined as:
[A] work prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by another
author for the purpose of introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining, re-
vising, commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the other work, such as
forwards, afterwords, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial
notes, musical arrangements, answer material for tests, bibliographies, appen-
dixes, and indexes ....
17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 1981).
188. A "compilation" is defined as "a work formed by the collection and assembling of
preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way the
resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship." Id. This definition
includes collective works. Id.
189. An "instructional text" is defined as "a literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared
for publication and with the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities." 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (Supp. V 1981). By virtue of the conjunctive requirement that the work have been
prepared "with the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities," this definition ex-
cludes books intended for use by a general readership. House Report, supra note 158, at 121,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5737.
190. May v. Morganelli-Heumann & Assoc., 618 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1980) (dictum);
Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P.C. v. Empire Constr. Co., 542 F. Supp. 252 (D. Neb.
1982); Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847 (D.N.J. 1981).
191. Childers v. High Society Magazine, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 1374 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
192. Mr. B Textiles, Inc. v. Woodcrest Fabrics, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
In Mr. B Textiles, however, copyright was awarded jointly to the fabric manufacturer and the
design firm which it had engaged to create the pattern at issue. Finding that the fabric manu-
facturer had made a significant contribution to the ultimate design, the court found the fabric
manufacturer and the design firm to be "[t]he authors of a joint work" for purposes of 17
U.S.C. § 201(a) (1982). See 523 F. Supp. at 25. Compare id. with B.F. Gladding & Co. v.
Scientific Anglers, Inc., 245 F.2d 722 (6th Cir. 1957) (where consulting engineering firm
jointly developed a trade secret with its employer, both the consulting firm and the employer
were entitled to use the trade secret).
193. But see Arthur Retlaw & Associates, Inc. v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 582 F.
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The consequences of restricting the categories of works in this
fashion can be not only surprising, but also financially devastating.
Consider, for example, the plight of a manufacturer who engages a
consultant to create a custom software program designed to opti-
mize production efficiency. 194 Such a program does not fit within
any of the classifications of works eligible to be considered works
made for hire. As a result, even though the manufacturer funded
all of the development costs, and even though both parties might
have assumed that the manufacturer would own the copyright, the
consultant would then be free to license the program to the manu-
facturer's competitors. As if to add insult to injury, moreover, the
consultant, thus relieved of the need to recoup any development
costs, could license the program to these competitors at a price far
lower than the manufacturer paid for its use. 195
Agreements Designating the Work as One Made for Hire.
Under the 1909 Act, the works for hire doctrine was applied on the
basis of the parties' presumed intent, rather than as a matter of
law.' 96 And the presumed intent favored copyright ownership in
the commissioning party. 197 Under the 1976 Act, however, the doc-
trine operates as a matter of law, and presumptively favors the
party commissioned to create the work; for a work created by an
independent contractor is one made for hire only if, inter alia, "the
parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that
the work shall be considered a work made for hire."'198
Absent a written agreement, therefore, a commissioned work
cannot be one made for hire.' 99 Furthermore, unlike a copyright
assignment,2°° the agreement is insufficient unless signed by both
Supp. 1010 (N.D. Ill. 1974). The Retlaw court ruled that the copyright in a newsletter - a
species of work clearly not encompassed within any of the categories needed to render a
commissioned work one made for hire - vested in the party who asked that it be printed.
The court mistakenly relied, however, upon case law decided under the 1909 Act, see id. at
1014, never considering the restrictive definition of "works made for hire" presently con-
tained in 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V. 1981).
194. The background facts of this hypothetical are based loosely (very loosely, in fact)
upon M & M/Mars v. Creative Output, Inc., No. B-83-613 EBB (D. Conn. filed Sept. 13,
1983).
195. For other entries in the parade of potential horribles, see O'Meara, supra note 178,
at 535-37.
196. May v. Morganielli-Heuman & Assoc., 618 F.2d 1363, 1368-69 (9th Cir. 1980).
197. Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing Corp., 369 F.2d 565, 568 (2d Cir.
1966).
198. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
199. Childers v. High Society Magazine, 561 F. Supp. 1374 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
200. See 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (1982) (only the copyright owner need sign the document of
assignment).
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parties. 20t Finally, some question arises concerning the effect of the
adverb "expressly." This term must denote more here than merely
the antonym of "impliedly"; implied agreements are already pro-
scribed by the requirement that there be a written instrument. Con-
sequently, it may well mean that the parties' intent that a
commissioned work be deemed one made for hire be set forth in
haec verba. If so, then language providing that copyright in a par-
ticular work "shall be owned exclusively by" the commissioning
party would not pass muster.20 2  Language parroting the statute,
and declaring that the work "shall be considered a work made for
hire," would be required. Whether or not this precaution is actu-
ally necessary remains uncertain.
This much, though, is certain: that the copyright in a work
prepared by an independent contractor for a commissioning party
will generally vest in the independent contractor; and that, in the
absence of an express agreement, it always will.
II. OWNERSHIP PURSUANT TO EXPRESS CONTRACT
The ownership of intellectual property need not be relegated to
the vagaries of statute or common law; the parties can resolve the
matter by express contract.2 °3 The advantages of this approach are
manifold. Foremost among these advantages are the ability to
avoid the uncertainties created by unsettled areas of law2°4 and the
possible frustration of the parties mutual understanding. 20 5 More-
over, a contract can do more than merely alter otherwise applicable
ownership rights. It can also more effectively protect contractually
201. Arthur Retlaw & Assoc., Inc. v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 1010
(N.D. Ill. 1984).
202. This language might nevertheless qualify as copyright assignment under 17 U.S.C.
§ 204 (1982). Note, however, that the contractor would still remain the "author" of the work
in question, the commissioning party thereby becoming merely his assignee. Hence the con-
sequences flowing from the redesignation of legal authorship when a work is deemed to be
one made for hire, see supra note 156, would not occur in this situation. Apparently, this
result was intentional. See Supplementary Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General
Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law: 1965 Revision Bill, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1965).
203. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1982) (copyrights); id. § 204(a); 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1982)
(patents); Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v. Eng'g Mechanics Research Corp., 401 F.
Supp. 1102 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (trade secrets). Because trade secrets are not subject to legal
ownership, see supra notes 100-1 11 and accompanying text, a contract purporting to govern
the parties' respective ownership of trade secrets should prohibit the non-"owner" from mak-
ing any unauthorized use or disclosure of the trade secrets. See, e.g., Sperry Rand Corp. v.
Pentronix, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 910, 917 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
204. See, eg., supra text accompanying notes 120-25.
205. See, eg., supra text accompanying notes 182-95.
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stipulated ownership rights2 6 by means of ancillary provisions not
directed to ownership as such. Clauses requiring an employee to
disclose to his employer all inventions conceived during the term of
employment,20 7 for example, render it easier to enforce a patent as-
signment agreement. Likewise, non-competition clauses prohibiting
an employee from competing against his employer within reason-
able territorial limits and for a reasonable period of time 0 8 obviate
the difficulty of proving that an employee presently competing
against his former employer is doing so improperly, through the use
of his former employer's trade secrets.20 9
On the other hand, there are disadvantages as well. When an
employer requests his employees to sign confidentiality agreements,
the danger arises that, by demanding what are in effect loyalty
oaths, he will insult his employees by suggesting that he considers
them capable of perfidy. Employees disaffected in this manner have
been known to allow "leaks" of valuable information,210 a result
precisely the opposite of that sought to be achieved.
Moreover, where a choice exists whether to characterize an
employee's creations as works made for hire belonging to his em-
ployer in the first instance or, instead, to require an assignment of
all rights in those creations, each choice offers corresponding
benefits and drawbacks. Pursuing the works-made-for-hire route
enables the employer to become the "author" for a variety of copy-
right purposes.21 2 By the same token, though, it may also expose
the employer to workmen's compensation21 3 and unemployment in-
surance liability214 where none would otherwise have existed. Pur-
206. Cf Cybertek Computer Prod., Inc. v. Whitfield, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1020, 1023
(Cal. Super. Ct. 1977) (the existence of an express contract makes it more likely that a court
will grant relief).
207. See, e.g., GTI Corp. v. Calhoon, 309 F. Supp. 762, 765 (S.D. Ohio 1969).
208. See generally Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REv. 625
(1960).
209. See, eg., Heyman v. A.R. Winarick, Inc., 325 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1963); Cudahy Co.
v. American Laboratories, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 1339 (D. Neb. 1970).
210. See 12 MILGRIM, supra note 129, § 3.02[2][e].
211. Such a choice is not always available. See supra text accompanying notes 182-93.
212. See supra note 156.
213. See CAL. LABOR CODE § 3351.5 (West Supp. 1984):
Employee includes:
(c) Any person while engaged by contract for the creation of a specially or-
dered or commissioned work of authorship in which the parties expressly agree
in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a
work for hire, as defined in Section 101 of Title 17 of the United States Code,
and the ordering or commissioning party obtains ownership of all the rights
comprised in the copyright in the work.
214. See CAL. UNEMPL. INS. CODE § 686 (West Supp. 1984):
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suing the assignment route avoids the exposure to workmen's
compensation and unemployment insurance liability, but, of course,
also deprives the employer of those collateral benefits flowing from
statutory authorship.215
This article will not endeavor to recommend particular con-
tract language. "How to" manuals already abound.216 Instead, it
will focus upon several selected obstacles to the allocation of owner-
ship rights by express contract. Knowing what to avoid, after all, is
at least half the battle.
A. Leading the Horse to Water
An obvious but often overlooked problem in attempting to re-
solve ownership rights by contract is that some employees and con-
sultants may simply refuse to sign on the dotted line.2t7Although
many employees will "knuckle under," '218 key employees 219 _
those very persons whose signature on a written contract is most
significant - are generally aware of their worth, and hence are
often reluctant to relinquish the fruits of their creativity. Collective
bargaining agreements may also make it difficult to persuade em-
ployees to sign contracts conveying their ownership rights.220
An employee's refusal to sign an express contract can be more
than merely a stalemate, moreover; as illustrated by Future Plastics,
Inc. v. Ware Shoals Plastics, Inc.,221 it can be a setback. While em-
"Employer" also means any person contracting for the creation of a specially
ordered or commissioned work of authorship when the parties expressly agree
in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a
work made for hire, as defined in Section 101 of Title 17 of the United States
Code, and the ordering or commissioning party obtains ownership of all of the
rights comprised in the copyright in the work. The ordering or commissioning
party shall be the employer of the author of the work for the purposes of this
part.
215. See supra note 202.
216. See, eg., 12A MILGRIM, supra note 129, Appendix C; R. RAYSMAN & P. BROWN,
COMPUTER LAW: DRAFTING AND NEGOTIATING FORMS AND AGREEMENTI §§ 6.06-6.11,
12.12 (1984).
217. See, e.g., Hobbs v. United States, 376 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1967); Gemco Eng'r &
Mfg. Co. v. Henderson, 151 Ohio St. 95, 84 N.E.2d 596 (1949).
218. Simko, Inc. v. Graymar Co., 55 Md. App. 561, 562, 464 A.2d 1104, 1105, cert.
denied sub nom. Knab v. Graymar Co., 298 Md. 243, 469 A.2d 452 (1983).
219. "Key employees" are those employees whose special knowledge makes them partic-
ularly valuable to their employer. See Von Kalinowski, Key Employees and Trade Secrets, 47
VA. L. REV. 583 (1961); Arnold, Before a Key Employee Leaves.. COMPUTERWORLD,
September 10, 1984, at ID/33, col. 1.
220. Many collective bargaining agreements limit employers' ability to compel their em-
ployees to assign patents. NEUMEYER, supra note 15, at 179 (Table 4.2). Some prohibit
employee patent assignments altogether. See, eg., id. at 182 (General Dynamics agreement).
221. 340 F. Supp. 1376 (D.S.C. 1972).
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ployed by Future Plastics, George Massey had twice been asked to
sign secrecy agreements. He refused both requests. After Massey
left to form his own company, Future Plastics brought suit, alleging
that he had misappropriated confidential information pertaining to
the manufacture of polyethylene. The court dismissed the lawsuit,
reasoning that Massey's refusal to sign a secrecy agreement negated
the implied duty of confidentiality which employees are usually
deemed to owe to their employers:
The relationship of employer-employee is not by itself sufficient
to create a confidential relationship. There must be an express
understanding as to the confidential nature of the information or
the circumstances must be such that the employee is aware of the
confidence placed in him by the.employer. . . . Massey refused
to sign two secrecy and non-competitive agreements submitted to
him. . . . The circumstances of Massey's employment were not
sufficient to make him aware of any special confidence reposed in
him.222
One lesson to be learned from Future Plastics, perhaps, is the risk of
having one's bluff called. 223  An employer ought to think twice
before presenting invention ownership or confidentiality agreements
to employees whom he cannot afford to discharge in the event they
refuse to sign.
B. Covering All the Bases
Admittedly, it is much easier.to inveigh against imprecise con-
tract language than it is to formulate language of sufficient precision
to withstand the afflictions to which imprecise language is prey.
Nevertheless, precision is an ideal well worth striving for, as Motor-
ola found out too late in Motorola, Inc. v. Fairchild Camera and
Instrument Corp. 224 The controversy in that case began when eight
executives left Motorola to work for Fairchild Camera. Each had
222. Id. at 1384. See also Hobbs v. United States, 376 F.2d 488, 496 (5th Cir. 1967)
(consultant who has been hired to invent, but who refused to execute patent waiver, retained
full patent rights to inventions conceived in connection with consulting activities).
223. Cf. Hogan v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 153 N.J. Super. 37, 43, 378 A.2d 1164, 1167
(App. Div. 1977) ("A. . . threat of immediate discharge in the event that the employee does
not sign a proposed restrictive covenant. . . can be inferred from conduct. . . . [The
request for the restrictive covenant indicates that the employer [is] insisting upon its execu-
tion."). See also Higdon Food Service, Inc. v. Walker, 641 S.W.2d 750, 751 (Ky. 1982)
(employee who signed non-competition agreement testified that the employer "didn't put it
where you'd be fired or anything, but I took it that if I didn't sign it I probably .. wouldn't
be there long . . ").
224. 366 F. Supp. 1173 (D. Ariz. 1973).
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signed an agreement with Motorola obligating him, upon termina-
tion of his employment, not to disclose any
[D]ata and information ... which I may originate ... during
my employment with [Motorola] and which is of a confidential
or secret nature such as product, machine and process develop-
ments, whether patentable or not patentable, manufacturing
"know-how" and specifications, cost and pricing practices, cus-
tomers' lists, records of customers' requirements and usages, per-
sonnel records, company financial records, and the like. ... "S
After these executives joined Fairchild, Motorola filed suit, alleging
that they had wrongfully disclosed to Fairchild over one hundred
trade secrets involved in Motorola's semiconductor manufacturing
process. The court rejected Motorola's claim, finding the above-
quoted language impermissibly vague. Motorola had not specified
in the non-disclosure agreement what items it considered to be trade
secrets; nor had it ever furnished to its employees a list of identified
trade secrets either during or at the termination of their employ-
ment. Consequently, the court held the agreement to be "unen-
forceable without specific advice at some time to employees as to
specific trade secrets claimed . ,,226
A converse but equally illustrative situation arose in GTI Corp.
v. Calhoon.2 27 Three former GTI engineers, each of whom had
signed an agreement requiring them to assign to GTI all their
"ideas and improvements," decided to form their own company for
the purpose of competing with GTI. After they left, GTI filed suit
in order to compel them to assign the ownership rights to a welding
machine which they had developed. Unlike the Motorola case, the
court held that the agreement did effectively include trade secrets -
but only trade secrets: "The terms 'ideas' and 'improvements' as
used in the employment agreement are broad and ambiguous. The
Court is of the opinion that these terms were intended to embrace
trade secrets only." '22 8 And, because the welding machine did not
meet all the criteria necessary to qualify as a trade secret, GTI
walked away empty-handed.
Inadvertent overprecision used imprecisely can also backfire,
as occurred in Ferroline Corp. v. Gen. Aniline & Film Corp. 22 9 Fer-
roline had licensed an affiliate corporation to use its secret process
225. Id. at 1183.
226. Id. at 1185.
227. 300 F. Supp. 762 (S.D. Ohio 1969).
228. Id. at 772.
229. 207 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 953 (1954).
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for the commercial production of iron pentacarbonyl. The license
agreement expressly provided that the affiliate would not divulge
Ferroline's secret anti-knock compound, whose principal ingredient
was iron pentacarbonyl. The agreement did not so provide, how-
ever, with regard to the process for manufacturing the carbonyl it-
self. Because of this omission, the court ruled that the affiliate was
under no obligation to maintain the confidentiality of Ferroline's
carbonyl manufacturing process, even though such an obligation
might have been implied had the parties not executed a written
agreement:
The trial court . [held] that, as the contract expressly pro-
vided secrecy only as to the anti-knock compound, no further
restrictions were implied. We think the trial court ruled cor-
rectly on this feature. Although a confidential relationship may
be implied in a proper case, ... where there is an express agree-
ment between the parties covering the subject matter, . the
law will not create another by inference.23°
Ferroline provides an excellent counterpoint to the Motorola deci-
sion discussed earlier,231 for the contrast underscores the caution
required to steer between the Scylla of underinclusiveness, on the
one hand, and the Charybdis of overinclusiveness, on the other.
Another common instance of inadvertent overprecision in-
volves the term "invention." More than one former employer has
stumbled over that word. In Jamesbury Corp. v. Worcester Valve
Co.,232 for instance, Howard Freeman, the director of research for
the Rockwood Sprinkler Company, had agreed to assign to Rock-
wood all "inventions" made during his employment there. While so
employed, he conceived an idea for a double-seal ball valve, but he
deliberately refrained from making any drawings until approxi-
mately one week after he had left Rockwood to form his own
double-seal ball valve manufacturing company. He then obtained a
patent on the valve. Several years later, a dispute arose concerning
whether Rockwood or Freeman's new company was the rightful
patentee. Rockwood argued that, because Freeman had conceived
of the valve while in its employ, it was contractually entitled to the
resulting patent. The United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit disagreed. The court reasoned that "invention" was a term
of art in patent law, denoting an idea not merely conceived, but also
reduced to tangible form. It then concluded that "Freeman had not
230. Id. at 922.
231. See supra text accompanying notes 224-26.
232. 443 F.2d 205 (lst Cir. 1971).
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made an invention, within the meaning of the employment when he
left Rockwood, because he had not put any of his ideas down in any
tangible form.
233
Similar reasoning undermined Amoco's claim in Amoco Pro-
duction Co. v. Lindley.234 While employed by Amoco, Ralph Lind-
ley had created a software program, known as the "Lindley
System," designed to analyze data regarding the prospects of locat-
ing oil in certain geological formations. After he left Amoco,
Amoco instituted suit to obtain ownership of the Lindley System
pursuant to the terms of an employment contract whereby Lindley
had agreed to "disclose. . . all inventions. . . which [he] . . . has
made or may make during his employment by [Amoco], and. . . to
assign all his right, title and interest in and to such inventions...
to [Amoco] . . . ." The Oklahoma Supreme Court reasoned that,
since the term "invention" was based upon patent law, "it follows
that [an] 'invention'... must be patentable whether it is or not
[patented]. 235 The court then held that, because software is gener-
ally not patentable,236 the Lindley System was not an "invention" to
which Amoco was entitled by virtue of its employment contract
with Lindley.23
7
Finally, where potentially copyrightable works are anticipated,
the agreement should provide for more than merely ownership of
the object or idea at issue; it should also explicitly allocate owner-
ship of all proprietary interests therein. The importance of this dis-
tinction stems from the rule that "[o]wnership of a copyright, or of
any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, is distinct from own-
ership of any material object in which the work is embodied. 238
By failing to observe this distinction, one purchaser of a film found
233. id at 213.
234. 609 P.2d 733 (Ok. 1980).
235. Id at 740.
236. See generally Note, The Policy Implications of Granting Patent Protection to Com-
puter Software: An Economic Analysis, 37 VAND. L. RV. 147, 165-72 (1984).
237. Accord, Monsanto Chem. Works v. Jaeger, 31 F.2d 188 (W.D. Pa. 1929), aft'd, 427
F.2d 1018 (3d Cir. 1930); Shur-loc Elevator Co. v. Purcell, 196 App. Div. 546, 188 N.Y.S. 25
(1921). But see Bailey v. Chattem, Inc., 684 F.2d 386, 391 (6th Cir. 1982) (a jury could find
that "invention" did not require reduction to practice); Kysor v. Alma Motor Co., 290 Mich.
76, 78-79, 287 N.W. 385, 386 (1939) (in contract agreeing to assign to employer all inventions
"except any invention which has already been started before this employment," the term
invention meant "a new idea of means created by the exercise of the inventive faculty for the
attainment of some useful purpose ,]. .. a mental result, a concept, a thing evolved from
the mind, a product of the intellect, a new idea of means generated by the mind of the inven-
tor, the embodiment of the inventive idea."); cf New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Singmaster, 71 F.2d
277 (2d Cir.) (agreement to assign "all patentable ideas"), cerL denied, 293 U.S. 591 (1934).
238. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1982).
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itself without any right to license the display of that film. 2 3 9
C. Getting Only What You Pay For
Consideration, the giving of something in exchange for the
benefit sought,2  is a condition precedent to the existence of an en-
forceable contract at common law.241 It is likewise essential to an
effective patent assignment.242 And, although copyright assign-
ments do not require consideration,243 there are hazards in proceed-
ing without it. First, a copyright assignment taken without
consideration can be superseded by a subsequent assignment taken
for consideration. 2' Second, it cannot always be determined in ad-
vance whether an invention will be copyrightable; recourse to an-
other form of intellectual property protection may become
necessary. Third, even though copyright assignments themselves
may not need consideration, there is no authority suggesting that
agreements providing for future such assignments are exempt from
the common law contract rule requiring consideration.245 Consid-
eration is therefore a practical prerequisite to any contract attempt-
ing to allocate ownership rights in intellectual property.
239. See Kingsrow Enter., Inc. v. Metromedia, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
240. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981). Consideration must be
"bargained for." Id comment b. Consequently, where an employer coerces an employee
into signing an agreement, there may not be bargaining, but instead duress. Cf id. § 176
comment e illustration 11:
A makes a threat to discharge B, his employee, unless B releases a claim that
he has against A. The employment agreement is terminable at the will of
either party, so that the discharge would not be a breach by A. B, having no
reasonable alternative, releases the claim. A's threat is a breach of his duty of
good faith and fair dealing, and the release is voidable by B.
The employee in Pemco Corp. v. Rose, 257 S.E.2d 885 (W. Va. 1979), for example, having
accepted an oral offer of employment, cancelled the lease on his home and contracted to
purchase a house near his new employer. On the first day of work, he was asked to sign a
non-competition agreement. Having already committed himself to his new job, the employee
had little choice but to sign. Under these circumstances, ruled the West Virginia Supreme
Court, the agreement was void for lack of consideration: "The covenant not to compete was
not a freely bargained for term or condition of employment, but rather was a term or condi-
tion of employment extracted from or imposed upon an employee under circumstances which
deprived him of any fair ability to negotiate." Id at 890. But see Barr Car Co. v. Chicago &
N.W. Ry., 110 F. 972 (7th Cir. 1901) (employer's threat to fire an inventor for refusing to
assign a patent does not constitute duress), cert. denied, 186 U.S. 484 (1934).
241. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981). But see id. §§ 82-94.
242. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1982); 4 DELLER, supra note 64, § 340.
243. 3 NiMMER, supra note 158, § 10.03(A), at 10-35. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 204(a)
(1982) (assignment of copyrights requires writing by assignor) with id. § 205(c) (in conflict of
assignments, first in time "for valuable consideration" and in good faith prevails).
244. 17 U.S.C. § 205(c) (1982).
245. Cf Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) ("State law is not
displaced merely because the contract relates to intellectual property ... .").
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Consideration presents a problem whenever an employer seeks
contractual concessions from persons already in his employ. An
offer of employment is itself sufficient consideration to support con-
tractual concessions from persons not yet employed.246 But what is
required to bind current employees? This question arises most fre-
quently with respect to non-competition agreements, 247 yet is fully
applicable to contracts purporting to allocate rights in intellectual
property.248
The major dispute centers upon whether the mere offer of con-
tinued employment to someone already employed constitutes ade-
quate consideration. Most courts hold that it does,249 the rationale
being that, by agreeing to continue the employment of a person
whom he can discharge at will, the employer has conferred a real
benefit upon the employee. In Higdon Food Service, Inc. v.
Walker,250 for example, Higdon Food Service had requested its
present employees, among them Gene Walker, to sign a non-compe-
tition agreement. Walker signed the agreement, but, after leaving
Higdon, attempted to have it declared invalid for lack of considera-
tion. Walker contended that the contract "was a one-way street,
providing certain protection for Higdon but nothing for him that
[he] did not already have." '251 The Kentucky Supreme Court
disagreed:
Higdon was under no more of an obligation to continue or renew
the employment than Walker was. The hiring itself (or rehiring,
246. Pertou v. Stewart, 243 F. Supp. 655 (D. Ore. 1965); Barb-Lee Mobile Frame Co. v.
Hoot, 416 Pa. 222, 206 A.2d 59 (1965).
247. See generally 12 MILGRIM, supra note 129, § 3.05[l][e]; Epstein & Freidman, Suffi-
ciency of Consideration for an Employee's Covenant Not to Compete, 1 COMPUTER LAW., No.
5, at 1 (1984); Annot., 51 A.L.R. 3d 825 (1973).
248. See Cybertek Computer Prod., Inc. v. Whitfield, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1020 (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1977) (agreement not to disclose not void for lack of consideration, even though
entered after employment began, where the written agreement merely documented the par-
ties' oral agreement at the inception of employment); Hewett v. Samsonite Corp., 32 Colo.
App. 150, 507 P.2d 150 (1973) (mere continuation of employment is insufficient consideration
to support a contract to assign patent rights); Mosser Industries, Inc. v. Hegar, 200 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 608 (Pa. C.P. 1978) (invention ownership agreement reciting $1.00 as consideration
was enforceable, even though entered into two months after employment began); A.B.L. Liq-
uidating Co. v. McCabe, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 29 (C.P. 1973) (invention ownership agreement
executed under seal during employment lacked adequate consideration, and was therefore
unenforceable).
249. Puritan-Bennett Corp. v. Richter, 8 Kan. App. 2d 311, 314, 657 P.2d 589, 592
(1983); Simko, Inc. v. Graymar Co., 55 Md. App. 561, 564, 464 A.2d 1104, 1107, cert. denied
sub nom. Knab v. Graymar Co., 298 Md. 243, 469 A.2d 452 (1983). But see Iowa Glass
Depot, Inc. v. Jindrich, 338 N.W.2d 376, 381 (Iowa 1983) (discerning an even split of
authority).
250. 641 S.W.2d 750 (Ky. 1982).
251. Id. at 751.
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if one prefers that word) was sufficient consideration for the con-
ditions agreed to by Walker. It makes no difference that Higdon
could have discharged him the next day. The point is that it did
not have to hire him - or keep him on - at all.252
The fact that the continuation of at-will employment still leaves the
employee vulnerable to immediate and arbitrary discharge, how-
ever, has persuaded a minority of courts to adopt a contrary posi-
tion, viz., that "consideration cannot be constituted out of
something that is given and taken in the same breath - of an em-
ployment which need not last longer than the ink is dry upon the
signature of the employee . *-253
This majority/minority alignment is subject to some qualifica-
tion, for the majority position is not as monolithic as might appear
at first glance. Initially, there is disagreement concerning whether
or not an employer is required to threaten the employee with dis-
charge unless he or she signs the agreement. 254 Additionally, many
of the courts comprising the majority position require employment
to continue for a substantial length of time following execution of
the agreement in order to be deemed adequate consideration.255
Lastly, the doctrinal foundation of the majority position - that,
absent a contract providing otherwise, employees can be discharged
at will - is beginning to show signs of erosion.256 Whether the
mere offer of continued employment is sufficient consideration to
support an invention ownership agreement is, in other words,
hardly the subject of firm consensus. As a consequence, failing to
confer some genuine benefit upon an employee in exchange for that
252. Id.
253. Kadis v. Britt, 224 N.C. 154, 161, 29 S.E.2d 543, 548 (1944).
254. Compare, e.g., Hogan v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 153 N.J. Super. 37, 378 A.2d 1164
(1977) (App. Div. 1977) (threat of discharge unnecessary), with McCombs v. McClelland,
223 Or. 475, 354 P.2d 311 (1960) (threat of discharge necessary).
255. Eg., Simko, Inc. v. Graymar Co., 55 Md. App. 561,464 A.2d 1104 cert. denied sub
nom. Knab v. Graymar Co., 298 Md. 243, 469 A.2d 452 (1983):
Were an employer to discharge an employee without cause in an unconsciona-
bly short length of time after extracting the employee's signature to a restric-
tive covenant through a threat of discharge, there would be a failure of the
consideration. . . .Rather than adopt a bright line but inequitable rule, we
deem the better approach is to hold that the continuation of employment for a
substantial period beyond the threat of discharge is sufficient consideration for
a restrictive covenant. What constitutes a substantial period is dependent on
the facts and circumstances of a particular case.
Id. at 567, 464 A.2d at 1107-08. Accord, Frierson v. Sheppard Bldg. Supply Co., 247 Miss.
157, 161, 154 So. 2d 151, 154 (1960) (dictum).
256. See, e.g., Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081
(1984). See generally Heinsz, The Assault on the Employment at Will Doctrine: Management
Considerations, 48 Mo. L. REV. 855 (1983).
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employee's agreeing to an allocation of ownership rights may jeop-
ardize the agreement.
The most obvious form of genuine benefit is money or its
equivalent. Although the amount of money need not be large,2 57 it
must be more than nominal.258 And, although payment can be de-
ferred, 59 the right to payment must be more than illusory. In one
case, for example, a so-called "guaranteed bonus" which was, in
fact, to be distributed only "in such amount as the Board of Direc-
tors . . . in its sole discretion shall determine," was held to confer
upon the employee a mere expectancy, not a right to payment suffi-
cient to constitute consideration. 2 ° Finally, payment, whether
present or deferred, should be a right to which the employee is not
already entitled;2 6 1 otherwise, it cannot qualify as new
consideration.
There exists no exhaustive laundry list of benefits that qualify
as consideration in these circumstances. Common sense is the oper-
ative principle. Suffice it to observe that, so long as the employee in
question is actually better off in some fashion, 26 2 the courts will not
likely refuse to enforce an invention ownership agreement for lack
of consideration.
257. See, eg., Hammermill Paper Co. v. Palese, Civ. No. 7128 (Del. Ch. June 14, 1983)
(salary raise of $100.00 per week).
258. The frequently used "consideration of $1.00," for instance, is generally held inade-
quate. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 comment b (1981). See, e.g., George
W. Kistler, Inc. v. O'Brien, 464 Pa. 475, 347 A.2d 311 (1975). But see Mosser Indus., Inc. v.
Hagar, 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 608 (Pa. C.P. 1978) (invention ownership agreement); cf Heb-
bard v. American Zinc, Lead & Smelting Co., 161 F.2d 339, 340 (8th Cir. 1947) (same, but
adequacy of consideration not addressed).
A practice much like the nominal "consideration of $1.00" recitation in its reliance upon
formalism, that of signing a contract "under seal" in lieu of consideration, has produced
uneven results. Compare Marine Contractors Co. v. Hurley, 365 Mass. 280, 310 N.E.2d 915
(1974) (covenant not to compete was valid) with A.B.L. Liquidating Co. v. McCabe, 62 Pa.
D. & C.2d 29 (C.P. 1973) (invention ownership agreement was invalid).
259. See, eg., Bradford v. New York Times Co., 501 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1974) (ten annual
stock payments following termination of employment); Modem Controls, Inc. v. An-
dreadakis, 578 F.2d 1264 (8th Cir. 1978) (payment of base salary for two years after termina-
tion of employment).
260. Environment Prod. Co. v. Duncan, 285 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1981).
261. See, eg., Insurance Agents, Inc. v. Abel, 338 N.W.2d 537 (Iowa 1983) (stock pay-
ments); Environmental Prod. Co. v. Duncan, 285 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1981) (salary raise and
profit sharing).
262. See, eg., Puritan-Bennett Corp. v. Richter, 8 Kan. App. 2d 311, 657 P.2d 589
(1983) (promotions, increased responsibility and greater importance in company operations);
Gordon Wahls Co. v. Linde, 306 Pa. Super. 64, 452 A.2d 4 (1982) (required notice before
employer could terminate employment, disability benefits, compensation changed from salary
to commission basis, increased commission rate, and reduction in the geographic scope of a
previously executed non-competition agreement).
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D. Biting Off More Than You Can Lawfully Chew
Employers occasionally overreach. A rather extreme illustra-
tion of this is Hillsboro Nat' Bank v. Hyde,263 where a bank at-
tempted to enforce what the court characterized as "the most
extraordinary contract which has ever fallen under our observa-
tion."' 264 The contract provided that the defendant, a bank em-
ployee, was to give the bank the benefit of his entire time. The bank
interpreted this to mean that any gainful activity whatsoever by its
employee, not merely services rendered in the bank's employ, were
to inure to the bank's benefit. On this basis the bank sought to re-
cover commissions earned by the employee after hours as a real
estate broker. Not surprisingly, the bank's effort was rebuffed: "We
do not think that. . . if defendant, in spare moments, wrote a book,
or taught at night school, or sang in a church choir, the fruits of his
extra toil on his own behalf should be swept into the tills of the
bank. 265
Employers' efforts to reap the rewards of their employees' inge-
nuity outside the job are seldom this bizarre. But the potential for
similar overreaching on a lesser scale arises in conjunction with
"hold-over '26 6 or "trailer" clauses2 67 requiring the assignment to
the employer of inventions created by the employee after the termi-
nation of employment.268 Trailer clauses reflect "the fact of business
life that employees sometimes carry with them to their new employ-
ers inventions or ideas so related to work done for a former em-
ployer. . . that the fruits of that work should belong to the former
employer. 269
In National Dev. Co. v. Gray,27° for example, Lawson had been
employed by National Development to design a machine used in
shoe manufacturing. While so employed, he conceived an idea for a
263. 7 N.D. 400, 75 N.W. 781 (1898).
264. Id. at 400, 75 N.W. at 781. The court, indeed, questioned whether the contract
"[could] be paralleled in the history of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence." Id., 75 N.W. at 781.
265. Id. at 403, 75 N.W. at 782. But see Mallory v. MacKaye, 86 F. 122 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1898) (enforcing an agreement that "the entire product and income of [the employee's] intel-
lectual and physical labor and skill should belong absolutely to [the employer], and be his
exclusive property ....").
266. Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. United States, 193 Ct. Cl. 187, 195-96, 432 F.2d 447, 452
(1970).
267. Comment, supra note 89, at 258.
268. See generally 4 DELLER, supra note 64, § 374; R. ELLIS, PATENT ASSIGNMENTS
§§ 183-94 (3d ed. 1955 & Supp. 1984); Knoth, Assignment of Future Inventions, 27 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 295 (1949).
269. Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. United States, 193 Ct. Cl. 187, 196, 432 F.2d 447, 452 (1970).
270. 316 Mass. 240, 55 N.E.2d 783 (1944).
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new type of machine. He then changed jobs, constructed the new
machine, and assigned the resulting patent to his new employer. On
these facts, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that National
Development was entitled to ownership of the patent:
We think that the idea had crystallized into such definite form by
the time Lawson left the plaintiff's employment that he and those
with whom he spoke concerning the new machine knew in a gen-
eral way the principles governing its operation and its probable
practical value. . . [W]hatever Lawson accomplished up to the
time he quit his employment belonged to the plaintiff .... 271
When used to protect an employer's rights in such circumstances,
trailer clauses serve a legitimate function.272
When trailer clauses go beyond what is reasonably necessary to
protect the employer's rights, however, they are unenforceable. A
research chemist employed by 3M, for example, had signed an
agreement obligating him to assign to 3M "all my rights to inven-
tions which I. . . may at any time hereafter make or conceive,...
relating to. . . any subject matter with which my work for said com-
pany [3M] is or may be concerned . . ,. . The absence of time or
subject matter limitations in this agreement prompted the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to reverse a decree
in favor of 3M. The appellate court reasoned that, under the terms
of the contract, the chemist was effectively indentured for life:
He was a research man prepared to devote his life to discoveries
of value to industry. Under this contract he was, however, if he
worked in another laboratory or for another manufacturer, re-
quired to assign his discoveries to appellee. This would effec-
tively close the doors of employment to him. Until the end of the
chapter he was compelled either to work for appellee or turn
over the children of his inventive genius to it.
274
This result, concluded the court, "conflicts with the public policy of
the land, which. . . encourages inventions and discourages the ex-
clusion of an employee from engaging in the gainful occupation for
which he is particularly fitted for all time, anywhere in the United
271. Id. at 247, 55 N.E.2d at 788. The precise moment when an employee sufficiently
conceives of an idea so as to entitle his former employer to patent rights in the resulting
invention developed after the termination of employment is a question of fact to be resolved
anew in each case. See, eg., John Mohr & Sons, Inc. v. Jahnke, 55 Wis. 2d 402, 198 N.W.2d
363 (1972).
272. Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. United States, 193 Ct. Cl. 187, 195, 432 F.2d 447, 452 (1970).
273. Guth v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 72 F.2d 385, 387 (7th Cir. 1934) (emphasis
added).
274. Id. at 388.
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Trailer clauses bespeak caution, in other words, and should be
drafted in the same spirit; for, in the eyes of the law, a fine line
separates cautious from rapacious. In order to preserve the effec-
tiveness of trailer clauses, both time276 and subject matter limits277
ought to be imposed.278
III. CONCLUSION
Ideally, the law governing ownership of inventions created by
employees should mirror the parties' expectations. Instead, legisla-
tive compromise 279 and judicial confusion 280 have produced a
sometimes bewildering maze of different rules, each with its own
qualifications and exceptions, in unwitting tribute to Justice
Holmes' famous aphorism that "[t]he life of the law has not been
logic .... ,,21t Rescue may be on the way.282  Until it arrives,
however, it behooves inventor and employee alike to become famil-
275. Id. at 388-89 (footnote omitted).
276. See GTI Corp. v. Calhoon, 309 F. Supp. 762 (S.D. Ohio 1969) (invalidating a five-
year trailer clause, even though the invention in dispute was related to the inventor's line of
work for his former employer). Milgrim recommends one year as the maximum safe dura-
tion. See 12 MILGRIM, supra note 129, § 5.02[4][d], at 5-50.
277. See Dorr-Oliver v. United States, 193 Ct. Cl. 187, 432 F.2d 447 (1970) (invalidating
a one-year trailer clause, where the invention in dispute was unrelated to the inventor's line of
work for his former employer).
278. Cautious draftsmanship is further compelled by the growing number of state "free-
dom to invent" statutes. See generally Gullette, State Legislation Governing Ownership Rights
in Inventions Under Employee Invention Agreements, 62 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 632 (1980). Min-
nesota's statute, for example, declares that:
Any provision in an employment agreement which provides that an employee
shall assign or offer to assign any of his rights in an invention to his employer
shall not apply to an invention for which no equipment, supplies, facility or
trade secret information of the employer was used and which was developed
entirely on the employee's own time, and (1) which does not relate (a) directly
to the business of the employer or (b) to the employer's actual or demonstrably
anticipated research or development, or (2) which does not result from any
work performed by the employee for the employer. Any provision which pur-
ports to apply to such an invention is to that extent against the public policy of
this state and is to that extent void and unenforceable.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.78(1) (West Supp. 1984). Accord, CAL. LAB. CODE § 2870 (West
Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 140, § 302(l) (Smith-Hurad Supp. 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 66-57.1 (Supp. 1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.44.140(1) (Supp. 1984).
279. See supra note 183.
280. See supra notes 11, 120, and accompanying text.
281. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
282. See, e.g., H.R. 6635, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (bill to amend the employee patent
assignment rules); S. 2138, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (bill to amend the copyright work-for-
hire rules); H.R. 5911, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (bill to amend the copyright work-for-hire
rules).
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iar with the twists in the maze lest, like the blind men contemplat-
ing the elephant,283 one suppose that he is inventing a trunk, the
other suppose that he is entitled to ownership of a tail, and both end
up with a rather unweildy pachyderm.
283. See E. ZIEGLER, FOLKLORE 10 (1973).
